dl 
; 
: J.— PSYCHOLOGY. 151 
; He holds (1) that the beauty of an object ‘is a character superadded 
_ to it from its relation to the mind in virtue of which it satisfies, or 
ee after a certain fashion, or esthetically.’ Now this being 
‘ pleased or satisfied is referable (within the situation) to the organism 
which has the quality of consciousness, i.e. in brief to the mind. So 
far at least it seems to be a differentiated feature in consciousness no 
longer merely recipient. Mr. Alexander tells us (2) that, within the 
relational situation, ‘the beauty is attributed to the object.’ He says 
that ‘it is the paradox of beauty that its expressiveness belongs to 
_ {I should say is referred to] the beautiful thing itself, and yet would 
: not be there except for the mind.’ He accepts (3) ‘value’ as that 
_ which satisfies a need; and he would (I think) not reject the view 
: that it is primarily a felt need for behaving or acting (socially he would 
_ add) in some manner in regard to, or with reference to, the object to 
_ which value is attributed. He accepts also (4), as precursors of true 
values, what he calls ‘ instinctive values,’ which I should speak of as the 
_ utilities of organic behaviour (e.g. under Darwinian treatment). We thus 
have (i) a specific mode of being conscious ; (ii) reference of this differen- 
tiated feature in consciousness to the object; and (iii) a recognition of 
the pragmatic value of tertiary characters as determined by social con- 
? duct. I urge that, mutatis mutandis, the same treatment applies to the 
_ secondary characters; and that such treatment does away with Mr. 
_ Alexander’s rather drastic difference of interpretation on the perceptive 
and on the reflective plane. In the case of secondary characters, no 
less than in that of values, we have (i) specific modes of being conscious, 
| (ii) reference of this differentiating feature in consciousness to the object, 
x 
= precursor. In other words, just as consciousness has its 
status in the hierarchy of salient qualities, so too within consciousness 
there are reflective and perceptive sub-qualities. 
It is, I think, clear that the question I have here raised is of im- 
‘ 
(1) as founded on the utility of behaviour thereto. Finally, we have 
“porta sufficient to justify the space I have devoted to it. It comes 
4 
“> 
as such, which the animals also possess, but with reflective conscious- 
ness or judgment.’ 
This conclusion seems to indicate that just as the quality of con- 
Sciousness marks a phase of emergent evolution, with something 
genuinely new supervenient to the quality of life, so too within this phase 
there are ascending sub-phases of emergence. In reflective consciousness 
(the iv, y of my table) there is, in ‘ value,’ something genuinely new, 
Supervenient on the perceptive consciousness (iv, 8) which affords its 
Mr. Alexander's general conclusion. ‘ Thus value,’ he says, ‘in the 
form of the tertiary qualities emerges not with consciousness or mind 
to this: Are there differentiating features (‘qualia’ they may be called) 
in consciousness as such? Do they, under conscious reference to 
objects, make these mental objects other than they would be if relation 
to consciousness were absent? If so, is this outcome of conscious 
reference restricted to the ‘ tertiary characters,’ or is it also applicable 
_ to the ‘ secondary characters’? My belief is that it has to be reckoned 
_ with throughout the whole range of mental evolution. 
