154 SECTIONAL ADDRESSES. 
There is, however, a very different but still quite empirical view. It 
may be said that consciousness as such embraces all the objects to 
which there is conscious reference. In other words, on this view it 
pervades the whole situation. That is ‘ where itis.’ Let us consider 
what is here meant. It rests on the interpretation of consciousness as 
a mode of connection under which objects in the whole situation are 
the terms related inter se. Hence Professor Woodbridge urges that 
objects are ‘in consciousness’ in the same sense as things are ‘in 
space’ or events are ‘in time.’ Just as the expression ‘in space’ or 
‘in time’ conveniently condenses the longer and more cumbrous ex- 
pression ‘in that kind of inter-relatedness of things which is called 
spatial or temporal ’; so too does ‘ in consciousness’ condense the fuller 
expression ‘in that kind of inter-relatedness of objects which we call 
conscious.’ And just as there is a spatio-temporal continuum within 
which things have place; so too, according to Mr. Woodbridge, ‘ con- 
sciousness may be defined as a kind of continuum of objects.’ We 
should, therefore, he says, deal with the relations of the objects in con- 
sciousness to one another ‘in the same way as that in which we deal 
with the relations of things in space to one another.’ It is, I think, 
clear that consciousness, on this view, is coextensive with what is some- 
times called ‘the field of consciousness ’"—that of which one is con- 
scious in reference thereto. In other words, consciousness is nowise 
limited to the organism, but is a special kind of relatedness which 
pervades the whole conscious situation. In my phraseology following 
Berkeley, the field of consciousness is ‘in mind by way of idea’ but 
not ‘ in consciousness by way of attribute.’ But we are here considering 
a different usage under a different terminology. 
Professor Holt, whose avenue of approach, like that of Mr. Wood- 
bridge, is primarily logical, and new-realistic, develops an interesting 
doctrine of ‘ neutral entities.’ I cannot here parenthetically discuss 
this doctrine with its stress on the objective reality of universals indepen- 
dently of consciousness. We may, I think, for our present purpose, 
take his view to be that what we commonly call the environment of an 
organism is au fond constituted by those universalised neutral entities 
we name objects, and that it is these neutral objects which call forth 
in the organism its specific responses or its more highly organised 
behaviour. But not all the environment calls forth such response or 
behaviour. That part which does so on any given occasion is what Mr. 
Holt calls a ‘cross-section.’ It is, so to speak, the business part of 
the total environment—-that part which counts for behaviour—and it is 
through behaviour that it is selected from the rest of the environment. 
Now this neutral cross-section, defined by responsive behaviour, ‘ co- 
incides exactly with the list of objects of which we say that we are 
conscious.’ Mr. Holt therefore, on the basis of this coincidence, feels 
himself free to call the environmental cross-section the ‘psychic cross- 
section,’ or ‘consciousness’ or ‘mind,’ within which the individual 
members are ‘sensations,’ ‘ perceptions,’ ‘ideas,’ &c. It is clear, 
therefore, that for Mr. Holt, as for Mr. Woodbridge, consciousness is, 
or includes, all that part of the environment to which there is conscious 
reference; that it ‘is extended both in space and time .. . being 
