156 SECTIONAL ADDRESSES. 
in which we enjoy this inner aspect—in which we are conscious in the 
most comprehensive sense of the word. Thus when one is seeing, 
hearing, tasting; when one is running, climbing, swimming; when 
one is imaging in reverie or in dream; when one is irritable, worried. 
or anxious; joyous or sad, in discomfort or at ease, fit and well, sick 
or sorry; when one is thinking or trying to recollect, following an 
argument, or solving a problem; accepting some statement in an atti- 
tude of belief, rejecting it, or poised in a state of doubt; when one 
chuckles over a joke, or winces under a bad pun; when one vibrates 
to music or shudders at the braying of a street band; nay even when, 
thereafter, ‘ silence like a poultice comes to heal the blows of sound ’; 
in all these cases, and in a thousand others, we have instances of what 
it is to be conscious in the most comprehensive sense. 
It will of course quite rightly and pertinently be asked: Who or 
what is thus conscious, now in this way and now in another? The 
empirical reply to this question (that to be given under emergent evolu- 
tion) is: The integrated system of all the fluent conscious events that 
are thus integrated within that system. That is just what the mind 
is—an integrated system of consciously inter-related terms intrinsic to 
the organism and correlated with its life. No doubt a further question 
lies behind: What is it that gives to such a system the integration that 
it has? It is here that Creative Evolution offers an explanation in 
terms of Agency. In accepting the ‘ given’ as that which we find in 
nature—and in leaving the question: What gives? to be discussed in 
the philosophical class-room—emergent evolution does but follow, as I 
think, the traditional procedure of science. 
Consciousness and Enjoyment. 
In speaking of a mind as an integrated system of conscious events 
the word ‘ conscious ’ is used in the broad and comprehensive sense that 
was almost universally accepted a generation ago. But in accordance 
with current usage we must now distinguish consciousness from the 
unconscious. I happen to regard the word ‘ unconscious’ as peculiarly 
unfortunate—chosen as it is on the lweus a non lucendo principle. But 
let that pass. There it is and we must make the best of it—seeking to 
penetrate its dark wood. Under the older and more comprehensive 
use, consciousness may be indefinable. As in the case of spatial or 
of temporal relatedness we have got down to something that we find, 
rather than to something that can be strictly defined. Hence one 
has to proceed by indicating instances that fall within the inclusive 
class which we so name. ‘The position is that, in the comprehensive 
class which we used to comprise under the heading of consciousness, 
it is now thought desirable to make two sub-classes—(a) the uncon- 
scious and (b) the conscious. There is call, therefore, for the indication 
of some criteria which shall serve to distinguish the one from the other, 
Here definition is required. And since the unconscious is ‘ served with 
the negative prefix,’ it is clear that the criteria we seek must distinguish 
by their presence the conscious from the unconscious in which these 
criteria are absent. Under what heading, then, are we now to place 
the comprehensive class including both (a) and (b)? I suppose we ~ 
