158 SECTIONAL ADDRESSES. 
character of physiological process, say in the cortex of the brain? It 
is sometimes said that ‘ when the brain-paths are worn smooth’ the 
correlated psychical process becomes (or tends to become) subliminal. 
Without denying the partial validity of some such interpretation in 
correlating the physiology and psychology of habit, can one accept 
the general principle that at some stage of lessened synaptic resistance 
enjoyment is subliminal and at some stage of heightened synaptic 
resistance it is supraliminal? Is there not rich enjoyment (apparently 
well above the threshold) in the performance of well-established habit ? 
And is there good evidence that (let us say) clear and vivid perception or 
swift and effective thought (which seems to thrill with supraliminal 
enjoyment) is proportional to physiological friction or synaptic 
resistance ? 
If the emphasis fall, not on the synaptic resistance overcome but on 
the establishment of a constellation of neuronic connections, and if it 
be urged that it is integration in progress which is correlated with what 
is psychically supraliminal, there may be much that is in favour of 
some such view. But does it follow that it is only when integration 
is in progress that enjoyment is supraliminal? There is surely much 
which is the outcome of well-established process that seems to be dis- 
tinctly above the threshold. JI am not satisfied that in our present state 
of knowledge heterogeneous treatment helps us very much to draw a 
definite line. 
Reverting, then, to homogeneous treatment, it is often said that 
the subliminal (commonly regarded, I think, as a synonym for the un- 
conscious) may best be defined as that which les beyond the reach of 
introspection. But the introspection in terms of which the distinction 
is made stands in need of careful re-examination. Apart from 
behaviourist criticism, which has to be reckoned with, Mr. Alexander 
has raised the pertinent question: What is it that is reached by 
introspection? Is it the process of minding (e.g. attending or being 
interested), or is it that which is minded (what one is attending to, 
or interested in)? If the latter, he denies that it should be called 
introspection ; it is a form of ‘ extrospection’ in relation to what, for 
him, are non-mental (and, for me, objective) images or concepts—in 
mind by way of idea. And if the former, he denies that there is such 
introspection; for minding, though it is enjoyed, cannot, he says, be 
an object of contemplation or at the same time then and there minded. | 
Now I have taken the word ‘ consciousness ’ as connoting mental pro- 
cess—i.e. that which is in mind by way of attribute. And I am dis- 
posed to agree with Mr. Alexander that mental process as such (and 
therefore consciousness as such) is not directly within the reach of — 
introspection. JI cannot follow this up. Indeed, my aim is only to 
show that if we are to define the supraliminal in terms of introspection 
we need a careful and up-to-date discussion of that in terms of which 
we so define it. To say that everyone knows what introspection is 
does not suffice. 
Furthermore, those who have carefully considered the matter will 
probably regard introspection as possible only at the level of reflective 
thought. Presumably the cow has not reached that level. But if the 
