J.—PSYCHOLOGY. 159 
supraliminal is to be defined as that which is within the reach of 
introspection, can the cow have any supraliminal enjoyment if she have 
no introspection by means of which to reach it? Does comparative 
psychology endorse this current method of dealing with that very 
elusive limit, the threshold? 
It must not be inferred from what I have said that the concept of 
threshold must be abandoned. It may be a difficult line to draw and 
yet be there as a boundary. We may still speak rather vaguely of 
supraliminal and subliminal. What I wish to suggest is that the line 
between them need not be coincident with that between conscious and 
unconscious. There are, I believe, modes of enjoyment both conscious 
and unconscious in the supraliminal field. But this reopens the main 
question: What are the differentiating criteria of the conscious ? 
Criteria of Consciousness. 
Ask the plain man what he means when he speaks of acting con- 
sciously and he will probably reply : ‘ I mean doing this or that with some 
‘measure of intention and with some measure of attention to what 
is done or to its outcome. The emphasis may vary; but one, or 
other, or both, of these characterise action that I call conscious. If 
I offend a man unconsciously there is no intention to give offence. 
When a cyclist guides his machine unconsciously he no longer pays 
attention to the business of steering, avoiding stones in the road, and 
so forth.’ Now if this correctly represents the plain man’s view, it 
is clear that a full consideration of his attitude would involve careful 
discussion of intention and of attention. This is beyond my present 
scope. I want to dig farther down so as to get at what, as I think, 
underlies his meaning, and thus to put what I have to submit in a much 
_ more general form. 
I want, if possible, to get down to what there is in the most 
primitive instances of consciousness—i.e. right down to that which 
characterises them as such. I believe that there is always in addition 
to that which is immediately given (say under direct stimulation in 
sense-awareness) some measure of revival with expectancy, begotten 
of previous behaviour in a substantially similar situation. Conscious- 
ness is always a matter of the subsequent occasion, and always pre- 
supposes a precedent occasion. In other words it is the outcome of 
repetition; and yet, paradoxically, when it comes it is something 
genuinely new. But this is the very hall-mark of emergence. That is 
why Mr. Alexander and I speak of consciousness as an emergent quality. 
_ Let us analyse some simple first oceasion—that on which a chick 
behaves to a ladybird will serve. The eye is stimulated from a distance 
with accompanying enjoyment (a). The chick responds by approach- 
ing and pecking with enjoyment in behaving (b). There follows con- 
tact stimulation with its enjoyment (c); and, thereon, behaviour of 
rejection with (d). We haye thus (as I interpret) a biologically 
determined but orderly sequence affording successive modes of enjoy- 
ment a, b, c, d. So far the precedent occasion. On a subsequent 
occasion there is (a) as before in presentative form; this is immediately 
‘given in sensory acquaintance. But (b, c, d) are also ‘in mind ’-— 
