160 SECTIONAL ADDRESSES. 
mediately or in re-presentative guise, under revival, as what Professor 
Stout calls ‘ meaning.” We have therefore (under an analogy) on 
the precedent occasion the notes a, b, c, d, struck in sequence. We 
have on the subsequent occasion (b, c, d) rung up by (a) through a 
‘mechanism ’ (a bad word since the mechanical is superseded) provided 
psychically and neurally in the instrument. And when the notes 
(a, b, c, d) thus vibrate together they have the emergent quality of what 
one may speak of as the chord of consciousness. 
What is there, however, about this emergent chord which 
differentiates it from the precedent sequence of notes a, b, c, d? It 
must be something psychical in its nature. I suggest that the revival 
carries with it a specific mode of new enjoyment which may be called 
‘againness ’; that which affords the basis of felt recognition. There 
is also something equally new in expectancy. That this is (so far 
as our own experience testifies) a factor in the chord of consciousness 
is, I should suppose, scarcely open to question. I believe that it arises 
somewhat thus. On the precedent occasion the order of sequence was 
(c), after (a). On the subsequent occasion the quale in consciousness 
takes the form of what one may call the ‘ comingness ’ of (c) precedent 
to the ‘ comeness’ which normally follows. But I cannot here follow 
up this clue. 
Now whereas on the precedent occasion it is behaviour unconsciously 
directed towards that from which stimulation arrives that determines 
the order b, c, d as sequent on a; on the subsequent occasion it is the 
“meaning ’ (b, c, d) which then consciously determines the-direction of 
behaviour. This centering of ‘meaning’ on that to which behaviour 
was on the precedent occasion unconsciously directed is the basis of 
conscious reference to an object. 
The characteristics, then, of a chord of consciousness are revival 
with expectancy and with conscious reference which anticipates, and, 
through anticipation (thus forestalling the event), may endorse, or | 
inhibit, the further course of behaviour. And its emergent character, 
as chord, makes consciousness, not merely an additive blend of con- 
stituent tones of enjoyment, but (in Browning’s forcible emphasis on 
a wholly new quality) ‘a star.” (Cf. Abt Vogler.) 
’ 
I have thus far dealt with the criteria of consciousness on the lines — 
of what I conceive to be its evolutionary genesis. I must now ask 
whether these criteria—revival with expectancy and reference—do not — 
characterise what we commonly regard as conscious enjoyment in our 
own adult life. My own experience is consonant with the outcome 
of genetic treatment. And I would ask others if there is not in our — 
current consciousness always some measure of felt ‘againness’ carried — 
over from the past in revival, and always some measure of ‘ comingness ’ — 
in expectancy. I would ask whether there is not, as essential to con- 
sciousness, some leaning back on previous experience, some leaning 
forward to that which the future has in store. Is not this what — 
M. Bergson means (I do not say all that he means) when he speaks © 
of consciousness as ‘ a hyphen ’ linking past and future? 
It need only be added that the conscious enjoyment in minding — 
lies in the felf againness and comingness and referring—i.e. in the -ing | 
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