134 SECTIONAL ADDRESSES . 
their agricultural capabilities. This period he reckoned at about two 
centuries, by which time the population was calculated at 6,000,000,000 
instead of the 1,600,000,000 which it had reached in 1891. The figure 
must not be taken to indicate the final population of the world, about 
which we know nothing, but the epoch marks finality of a certain kind— 
namely, the end of the colonising period of history as colonising has 
hitherto been conducted. The world will then be completely parcelled 
out among the nations, and since it is very difficult to displace a nation, 
it is probable that those which occupy the world at the end of the colonis- 
ing period will remain in possession for a long time, even as time is 
reckoned in the pages of history. If we allow a generation for the set- 
back of the War we may roughly reckon our zero-time as 1923 instead of 
1891, which, on the basis of Mr. Ravenstein’s figures, would still give 
about two centuries, or six generations, in which to provide the temperate 
climates of the British Empire with a sufficiency of British stock to 
ensure the continuance of their British character. 
There is, however, a school of thought which sees the salvation of 
the home country in a reduction of its population. I take their strategic 
argument first. It is contended that Great Britain would be safer in 
time of war if it had no more people than its farms can feed. Judging 
‘by France and the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, this would 
be about one-half of our present population, for our country is small 
though fertile. The conditions of our strategic security have, however, 
undergone a great change since 1914. The best plan of campaign for a 
combination of European Powers bent on overthrowing the citadel of 
the Empire would be an attack by combined air-fleets, which could be 
concentrated on London, the great manufacturing towns, and the ship- 
building yards, wholly destroying them one by one by intensive bom- 
bardment. This plan would be more effective than naval blockade, 
which it is very difficult to make complete, and is liable to bring in new 
belligerents owing to interference with neutral shipping. In order to 
have strategic security in this island we must therefore be able to meet 
the air-force of a European combination as well as carry out our tradi- 
tional plan of despatching a powerful expeditionary force for the support 
of a friendly Power. This active defence requires large population and 
high devlopment of technical industries, and therefore could not be 
sustained by a rural Britain. 
The economic argument for reduced population has received ready 
but uncritical assent owing to the great want of employment since the 
War. It is stated that this island will never be able to support in 
proper comfort a population of forty-three million, the present figure. 
But the population which can be sustained in a country depends 
jointly upon internal resources and geographical position. The com- 
mercial position of Great Britain is more favourable than that of any 
other island of equal size, and the large amount of good coal, besides 
iron ore and beds of salt, enable full advantage to be taken of the 
geographical position in manufacturing for export. According to the 
estimate made in 1905 the stock of accessible coal in the United 
Kingdom is sufficient to last more than four hundred years at the present 
rate of output, and an estimate made in 1915 gives a yet larger stock. 
on 
