226 SECTIONAL ADDRESSES. 



as a ' compromise formation.' According to the girl's own account of the 

 stealing, when she thought of certain ' bad things,' stealing was the only 

 way in which she seemed to be able to escape from her thoughts. One 

 form of misconduct was thus, as it were, substituted for another, that 

 form which was repressed being the real source of the trouble. The 

 futility of punishment of practically any kind in a case such as this is 

 obvious. Punishment would in all probability only aggravate the evil. 

 Yet when the source of the trouble was known, this case of delinquency 

 could be, and was, dealt with successfully. 



Cases of this kind tend to make one speak and think of treatment 

 rather than punishment. It might be asked whether this is not the point 

 of view from which all cases should be approached, not as a matter of 

 ethics, but as a matter of practical expediency, punishment being merely 

 a particular method of treatment. The proposition is arguable, but only 

 so long as we confine attention to the individual delinquent, and that is 

 only one side of the picture, as we shall see presently. Personally, I do 

 not think the point of view will matter very much so long as we keep firmly 

 in mind the essential fact that the action taken, whether we call it treat- 

 ment or punishment, is primarily action taken by society for its own 

 protection, the reform of the criminal being a means adopted to this end. 

 There is undoubtedly a class of offender in whose case treatment, rather 

 than punishment, is the appropriate notion and procedure. Other cases 

 occur with fair frequency in which punishment as ordinarily understood 

 is quite ineffective as regards the reform of the individual. The case of 

 serious mental defect may be instanced. The facts are such that we 

 find the old problems of responsibility, so far as they were practical 

 problems at all, cropping up in a new guise, and in new surroundings. It 

 may be possible to determine beforehand, without waiting for the event, 

 whether punishment will be effective for reform, and if so what kind of 

 punishment, or whether the case is one demanding treatment, and not 

 punishment at all, and if so what kind of treatment. The problems now, 

 however, are neither legal nor ethical problems, but purely psychological 

 problems. 



The suggestion that in some cases punishment, as ordinarily understood, 

 may be quite ineffective leads us on to the consideration of the measures 

 society takes, and must take, for its own protection in certain instances. 

 The most important method of protection that society utilises is the 

 restraint of the offender in some appropriate institution — as far as the 

 idea of punishment is concerned, some sort of prison. The restraint or 

 imprisonment may be merely temporary, or it may be permanent. In 

 the first case it is clear that the reformatory aspect of punishment ought 

 to be still kept in view, so far as the psychological situation is taken into 

 account. If it is not, it does not require much foresight to prophesy 

 somewhat lamentable results. In particular, if the criminal is returned 

 to social life, not only with his tendency to the original form of misdeed 

 unaffected, but with other anti-social tendencies developed by his prison 

 life, or by circumstances arising out of his prison life, our only possible 

 verdict is that society is playing the fool. On the other hand, when the 

 restraint is permanent, while reformatory measures must not be entirely 

 excluded as intrinsically hopeless m every case, it is clear that the whole 



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