J.— PSYCHOLOGY. 229 



disapprobation dependent on the evoking of the moral sentiment of which 

 the punishment is a concrete and tangible embodiment, recoil from the 

 act because of the existence in the individual who is tempted of the moral 

 sentiment in question in however feeble, attenuated, and fragmentary a 

 form — all these are motives holding back an individual member of society 

 from wrongdoing. The legal punishment exercises its deterrent influence 

 because it, as it were, embodies and presents all of them in unmistakable 

 and arresting fashion. The relative force of the different motives will 

 vary with individuals. But until we can rely on the last of these motives 

 being of itself sufficiently powerful to restrain every individual member 

 of society from the breach of social laws — which would seem to involve 

 a radical change both in the existing social structure and in human 

 nature — the social necessity of some kind of penal system, in the strict 

 sense, must remain. 



Arguing on the basis of the deterrent influence of punishment, several 

 writers have defended punishments which can only be described as 

 vindictive. This has been due in part to the belief that the deterrent 

 effect depended solely on fear, and in part to inability to distinguish 

 between hatred of an offence and hatred of the offender. After the sound 

 and generally acceptable statement of the relation between penal law 

 and the moral sentiments of the community, just quoted, the same legal 

 authority goes on to say : ' The criminal law thus proceeds upon the 

 principle that it is morally right to hate criminals, and it confirms and 

 justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals punishments which 

 express it.' This is a frank enough expression of the vindictive theory 

 of punishment. We are here concerned neither with the ethics nor with 

 the religion of the view thus expressed. It is certain that, psychologically, 

 hatred of a sin need not involve hatred of the sinner. It is also certain 

 that the writer in this passage is speaking of the emotions of anger and 

 revenge, and not of any moral sentiment at all. 



I do not wish, however, to develop that line of thought at present. 

 Enough has already been said about vindictive punishment. I would 

 rather in conclusion revert to the varjang motives upon which the deterrent 

 influence of punishment depends. Two points in particular demand notice. 

 In the first place we cannot assume that penal law and moral sentiment 

 will always be in harmony, and so reinforce one another. There may, 

 in fact, be acute conflict between the two, as far as a considerable minority 

 of the members of a community are concerned. In certain cases also 

 they may be, so to speak, indifferent to one another. In either case the 

 psychological situation is very radically modified, and the problems of 

 punishment may in practice become very difficult. 



In the second place the influence of the different motives may, as we 

 have seen, vary with the individual. If that be so, two consequences 

 would appear to follow. On the one hand — and this refers more particu- 

 larly to the adult criminal — our penal system must be such as to appeal 

 with sufficient cogency to all the motives, as far as the criminally disposed 

 individual is concerned. On the other hand — and now we have in mind 

 chiefly the juvenile delinquent — it is of capital importance that we should 

 recognise as early as possible in their criminal career those individuals who, 

 either by nature or circumstances, or both, are tending towards abnor- 



