J.— PSYCHOLOGY 183 



This does not aid memory in the direct way in which association may 

 aid the recall of the objects. If an analogy is seen for the variants of the 

 first series, the subject tries to apply this as a controlling concept to the 

 following series, and here it may have misleading results and cause con- 

 fusion. The second shape in the first series was seen as ' a slipper ' by 

 everyone (possibly the fact that in Set X the second object was a slipper 

 contributed to this interpretation). ' Slipperness ' is not very appropriate 

 for an accurate recall of the later variants of this shape. The first shape 

 of the first series was seen as a picture hook and a chicken's head, with 

 misleading results in each case. Reproductions are worked out in terms 

 of the analogy. 



' I feel my drawing has become too much simply like a slipper.' 

 ' How did the horse one go ? ' ' Which is the bird one .'' ' 



The subjects who got hold of the concept of the shape reproduced 

 shapes correct in general features, but sometimes wrong in orientation or 

 in colour, and sometimes unlike the original when this is regarded as a 

 sensory whole. 



As in Set X, there is evidence of simple memory images. Thus one 

 subject writes : 



' I tried to think of the shape. I remembered angles one side, 

 curves the opposite — I couldn't remember which. Suddenly I had 

 a visual image of the two corners I've made.' 



Both here and in the following there is a combination of knowledge 

 ' that so and so is so and so ' and a memory of the sense particular. 



' The blue one. I've a visual image of this, not definite ; also I 

 remember that there were three projections on the right, the centre 

 one largest, the lowest one curved.' 



To return to my purpose in referring to these studies : To explain what I 

 find I need to draw on explanatory principles typical of each of the current 

 schools. If I stress position in series and the influence of repetition on 

 recall, I am using factors which would find their place in Behaviourism. 

 Indeed, if I stress the influence of the present sensory pattern on the 

 subsequent delayed recall, I may be using a factor which could fall under 

 the conception of conditioning. Much of what I have said about the 

 intrinsic characteristics of the pictures, objects and shapes which are 

 best recalled is explicable in terms of organised sensory wholes, and some 

 of these organisations seem to be simple data. On the other hand, many 

 of the reproductions depend upon seeing relations, particularly the 

 relation of likeness. ' Gestalt theories and noegenetic principles both 

 have their place.' There is also evidence that likes and dislikes play 

 their part, and that emotional factors influence forgetting and recall. 

 If I separate form from colour in assessing the recall of the objects and 

 shapes, am I confusing logical with psychological analysis and following 

 the old view of elements ? In a certain sense, ' yes.' But if colour and 

 form can be ill-mated in reproduction, must they not be psychologically 



