SECTIONAL TRANSACTIONS— F. 351 



The second side is the relation of the consumers' movement to agriculture, 

 at home and abroad. Numerous problems arise here : 



(a) Direct farming by the societies and wholesales. This is of small 

 value when it is incidental ; and in fact it is largely a legacy of 

 history, but it may be important in the future, as part of a co- 

 ordinated agricultural policy. 



(b) The contact of the home farmer with the movement. No contact 

 is of any value unless it is on a quality basis. Organisation is 

 as necessary to the producing farmer as trade unionism is to the 

 wage-earner. 



(c) The attitude of the movement towards organised marketing on a 

 national or regional basis. This is a vital problem in the milk 

 industry to-day. The movement must adapt itself to commodity 

 selling, but must not sell out to it. The societies and their whole- 

 sales must retain their traditional unity. The new orientation of 

 producer and the State versus the consumer needs careful watching, 

 both in marketing and in fiscal policy. 



(d) The relation of the movement to agricultural co-operation over- 

 seas — e.g. in Denmark, Canada, New Zealand, and elsewhere. 

 Here, elasticity is better than a rigid contract, which obstructs the 

 blending of consumers' demand. 



(e) Intertrading and the international mobilisation of co-operative 

 credit. Intertrading between wholesales has no dangers. Inter- 

 trading between organised producer and organised consumer is 

 greatly obstructed by tariffs. International mobilisation of co- 

 operative credit must not be allowed to freeze the banking resources 

 of the consumers' movement. Special aid to agriculture is the 

 task of the several States concerned. 



Dr. E. Roll. — Effects of the world depression on the Banking Systems of 

 Central Europe. 



It was the peculiar sensitiveness of its credit systems to economic and social 

 tension and political interference which made Central Europe the storm- 

 centre of the panic of 1931. 



It is well known that the crisis of confidence began in the autumn of 1930 

 when the results of the German elections revealed a state of great political 

 instability. Since then, events in all Central European countries, as well 

 as the adopted remedial measures, show considerable similarity. We find 

 that in all countries the banks lose a considerable proportion of their deposits, 

 varying from 1 1 per cent, in Czechoslovakia to 30 per cent, in Austria, 

 Hungary and Germany, and reaching even greater proportions in Rumania. 

 These losses are accompanied by decreases in the gold and foreign exchange 

 reserves of central banks, by increases in the note circulation, and by con- 

 siderably increased stocks of discounted bills. In some countries the 

 traditional liberal credit policy was sufficient to stop the run, in others more 

 radical measures had to be introduced. They comprised as a rule very 

 stringent regulations for dealings in foreign exchange, the guaranteeing 

 by the State of the deposits of insolvent banks, together with a radical re- 

 organisation — again with State help — of their capital structure. 



In Germany, owing to the scale on which difficulties appeared and 

 remedies had to be applied, these measures amounted to a virtual trans- 

 formation of the entire character of the banking system. An unprecedented 

 writing off of losses — by means of capital reductions, amalgamations and 



