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J.—PSYCHOLOGY. 187 
We end by ‘projecting’ certain of these original feelings. The 
external ‘ objects’ of our perception have been separated from or carved 
out of originally vague external ‘ situations’ of which we or our remote 
ancestors were first conscious merely as diffuse modifications or feelings 
of the self. So, too, any colour or sound comes to be regarded no 
longer as a seli-feeling but as a something projected and existing outside 
us. The degree to which such projicience and presentation is carried out 
varies with different sensations: colours clearly have a projected, 
apparently independent, existence ; sounds, smells, tastes, hardness and 
temperature are only imperfectly projected ; the painful prick of a pin 
and our sensations of movement, though not projected, are nevertheless 
regarded as ‘ presentations ’ to the self ; whereas our experiences of visceral 
sensations are hardly even presented: they seem almost as clearly 
modifications of the self as are our emotions and other affects. 
THe Ornicin or Acts AND CoNnTENTS. 
This difference between the acts and the contents of consciousness— 
between the conscious acts of apprehending, recalling, deciding, inferring 
and what is consciously apprehended, recalled, decided, inferred—is a 
most important one. It is exemplified in the two kinds of memory which 
are distinguishable. On the one hand, we may recall the separate acts of 
the self, say, in the course of solving a problem or of acquiring some 
specific skill; these are individually unique and only individually 
revocable. On the other hand, we may recall the generalised contents of 
our consciousness, i.e. of presentations we have received by a repetition of 
such acts—e.g. in learning a prose passage or series of skilled movements. 
I would suggest that the distinction between conscious acts and 
contents has come about with the gradual differentiation of higher 
and lower levels of mental activity—and in the following manner. 
There is no awareness of self-activity when we sense a colour or a tem- 
perature, or when we perceive a familiar object, or when an idea ‘ occurs’ 
to us. Our sensations, our perceptions and many of our thoughts and 
ideas are, I suggest, the unconscious ‘acts’ of relatively lower mental 
levels. But when these lower-level ‘acts’ are accompanied and received 
by the self-activity of the highest levels, they become ipso facto ‘ pre- 
sentations ’ to the self. A loud noise to which we are impelled to attend 
or an idea which ‘ occurs to the mind ’ is not a conscious presentation (or 
content of consciousness) until the self receives it. 
I suggest that such differentiation of higher and lower levels has never 
occurred to the same extent in the case of our kinesthetic and, especially, 
cenesthetic sensations and in the case of our feelings (which depend on a 
more primitive, thalamic, activity): we fail, therefore, to objectify them 
immediately as presentations, and they continue to be received in their 
_ primordial undifferentiated state. 
By virtue of recall, however, even the acts of the self and its feelings 
can become more or less objectified as * presentations’ (although, of 
course, they are not ‘ projected’ as independent objects). The acts of 
decision or apprehension and the emotions, attitudes, etc., of the self at 
one moment can through lower level transfer become at the next moment 
themes of contemplation by the self. Thus, we may account for the occur- 
