448 SECTIONAL TRANSACTIONS.—H. 
evidence of a renewed funereal cult illustrated by a series of offertory bowls and 
goblets, amongst which were miniature jugs otherwise associated with domestic snake 
worship. Some of the bones had drifted outside the entrance of the tomb, and the 
skull with which they are associated, according to Dr. L. H. Dudley Buxton’s report, 
is intermediate between the old Mediterranean type of Crete and the intrusive 
Armenoid. 
The discovery of this temple tomb had a sequel of almost equal importance. A 
short section of paved way led to what was clearly the residence of the priestly warden 
of this Minoan ‘ Holy Sepulchre.’ This contained a private chapel, with choir-stalls, 
chancel screens and, in the inner sanctum, an altar and sacred symbols of the cult. 
Saturday, September 26. 
His Honour Jupce Dowpatu.—The Psychological Origins of Law. 
1. James Ward.—A lawyer dealing with psychology must choose his psychological 
expert, and I follow Ward. His articles in the 9th, 10th and 11th editions of Hncyclo- 
paedia Britannica made him, in the words of the Times, * the father of modern English 
Psychology’; and his Psychological Principles, 1918, is, in the words of Professor 
Dawes Hicks, ‘ beyond all question the greatest and most original work on the science _ 
in the English language.’ Forty years of active and accurate reading in British, 
Continental and American literature enabled him to state, with references, how far 
he agreed with other writers and, when he differed, to state why. The book is com- 
prehensive and consistent, and free from ‘ subreptions,’ so that every word will stand 
the pressure of exacting analysis. 
It is a long way from the law of the jungle to the law of a civilised state, but the 
progress is continuous, and the path is throughout illuminated by Ward’s principle 
of subjective selection, which, far more than Darwin’s correlative principle of natural 
selection, is destined to be the guide of the social sciences and a hope for individual 
men. A meal fit for a king implies a king for whom it is fit as well as a meal ; and he 
becomes a king by means of subjective selection—a selection made by him or his 
ancestors, and giving him a psychological environment which makes him what he is 
and which articulates with that of his fellows into a social whole. E 
2. Subjective Selection.—Intellegere means to pick out or select, and intelligence 
means selection by the individual subject of ends which will give him satisfaction and _ 
of means conducive thereto. But subjective selection is more comprehensive than — 
intelligence ; for subjective selection includes selection determined by hereditary 
disposition or acquired habit, whereas intelligence refers to special choice. The 
selection of cabbage by a caterpillar or of honey by a bee (or by a butterfly transformed 
from a caterpillar) is subjective selection, for the subject selects the object ; but it 
is not called intelligence, though the hereditary disposition has, in Ward’s view, been 
developed by the protracted operation of something like a humble kind of intelligence. 
And, furthermore, though the bee is hereditarily disposed to gather honey, he makes 
something in the nature of an individual choice between this rose and that. 
The great difference between man and lower animals, and between civilised and 
uncivilised men, lies in subjective selection and its range, complication, and flexibility. 
In the process of this elaboration the discovery and development of language is of 
critical importance. For by language man identifies, and relates, and subjects to { 
intellectual control, those recurrent elements of the changing scene which he (rightly 
or wrongly) conceives to be of importance to him. The history of legal institutions — 
is the history of legal ideas and the history of legal ideas is sometimes best extracted 
from the implications of language. z 
3. Community.—Totemite language shows that early man conceives his eQrporataay 
unity as somehow resembling that of a biological species. The psychology of a 
biological species presents many still unsolved problems; but the unity appears to 
be that of a community (Gemeinschaft) rather than a society (Gesellschaft), t.e., it is 
based on disposition rather than device, or, to use Tarde’s terms, on ‘ imitation y || 
rather than ‘invention.’ Not that these are strictly separable, for disposition 
develop, and are the result of experience arising from experiment, and require some 
thing in the nature of device for their realisation. But in a community the individual 
accepts the law of the community as he finds it; his task is indicated to him by — 
circumstances with which he is familiar, and he is prepared to doit. In such cireum- 
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