A470 SECTIONAL TRANSACTIONS.—J. 
artists showed significantly less phenomenal regression than a control group of the 
same sex and average age. An attempt was made to discover whether there was 
an association between amount of phenomenal regression and temperamental type, 
but with the numbers available no significant difference could be established. 
Dr. F. Averine.—The Influence of Volition upon Thinking. 
The present communication embodies the results of a series of experiments, 
continuing work previously carried out in the laboratory of King’s College, which 
were intended to investigate the nature and amount of influence that will-acts have 
upon processes of thought; in particular, upon the three fundamental processes of 
original knowing, i.e. the cognising of experience, the awareness of relations between 
items of experience, and the production of ideal correlates. 
The last-named problem was attacked by the method of Free and Relationally 
Predetermined Reactions (so-called ‘Controlled Associations’). Results show that 
the relation determined by the acceptance of the instruction (i.e. resolution to react 
in a particular way) works, even though it may no longer be clearly in consciousness, 
but that consciousness of it tends to reappear in certain subjective conditions ; that 
the different relations investigated function in a similar way through notional aware- 
ness; and that abstract concepts tend to arise as mediating between the more 
particular meanings of stimulus and reaction words. Temporal values of the several 
kinds of reaction are considered, together with the order of difficulty of the relevant 
processes. The conclusion is drawn that volition affects the process of correlate 
eduction by way of a conative attitude which may be wholly subconscious. Such 
conative attitudes may be described as volitional dispositions or tendencies, and 
may be compared with connate instinctive dispositions. 
Original cognising of experience was investigated by means of the tachistoscopic 
exposition of monochrome letters and monochrome and coloured symbols, under 
the influence of two different instructions: (1) ‘ Observe what you can and record 
all that you can see’; (2) ‘ Look for a given letter (or symbol) if it should be shown, 
and record all that you can see.’ The results in both cases were marked in such a 
way that the gain, if any, for the required items could be shown, together with any 
loss in the amount of items seen as a whole. Working with the first instruction the 
percentage marks could be taken as an indication of the expectation that any given 
letter or symbol would be apprehended; working with the second the actual 
percentage for letter or symbol was directly calculable. 
A similar procedure was followed in respect of relations of similarity of shape and 
of colour obtaining between the items exhibited. 
Results indicate a very considerable gain for the letter, symbol or relation which 
subjects had determined to apprehend if it were there ; and a loss (though variable) 
in the number of items or relations seen when the experiment was carried out with 
the second instruction. 
The indication is that the will-act to apprehend a given item or relation sets up 
a conative tendency to observe it if it is actually presented ; while, at the same time, 
in general there is inhibition of other items and relations. (Caveat. It is possible — 
and, according to introspection probable, that items and relations are in fact 
apprehended, but fail to be retained between the time of exposition and the act of — 
recording.) The gains over the calculated expectation of any given letter, symbol — 
or relation being apprehended range from 69 per cent. to nil (or even, in one or two 
instances, to minus quantities). The inference is that, while individual differences 
come into play, the antecedent will-act very considerably influences the subsequent 
process of perception of items and relations by setting up a conative disposition to — 
apprehend them if they should be in the presented field, but that the inhibition bears 
| CB + tg ee” al ee wt Bey 
* 
ae = 
no ascertained relation to the disposition. These volitionally initiated conative — 
dispositions or tendencies may, again, be compared with instinctive dispositions, in 
virtue of which conscious organisms ‘ pay attention to objects of a certain class or — 
kind’; in regard to which they have also a tendency to behave in a more or less — 
definite manner. 
There is a further observation which makes the analogy between instinct and | 
will even more complete. The experiments show that one may be aware of a definite _ 
relation in the absence of awareness—certainly in the absence of clear awareness—of 
one (or even of both) of its fundaments. One need not suppose that instinctivels 
behaviour requires clear cognitive guidance. 
| 
