92 BULLETIN OF THE 



this was practical repudiation. In 1873 silver was demonetized, 

 and the public debt was ipso facto made payable in gold coin 

 only. Subsequently millions of this debt changed hands and was 

 bought from day to day by tens of thousands of "innocent third 

 parties," who thereby acquired the right to ultimate payment in 

 gold coin as then current. Millions of the debt were refunded, 

 the old bonds being redeemed and new ones sold. The face of 

 the new bonds disclosed a contract to pay coin, and the law re- 

 cognized no coin except gold. All rational doubt as to whether 

 " coin of the present standard value" meant gold which was in 

 universal and exclusive use in all coin transactions, or silver, 

 which was never used except for export, was put at rest by the 

 formal abrogation of silver in the regular course of legislation. 

 At this stage the "Bland Bill" intervenes, and orders the manu- 

 facture of millions of a new coin having a much less value than 

 that which the bond specifies, and makes them legal tender for 

 all debts, public and private. Is it possible for anybody to show 

 that this is not a repudiation of a portion of the public debt? 



As regards those bonds which were refunded after the passage 

 of the Bland bill, there seems to be no doubt that they are hon- 

 estly payable either in silver or in gold. It was a clear case of 

 caveat emptor. The great notoriety given to the discussion of 

 this measure was abundant notice to all purchasers that the bonds 

 which they were buying for gold would be liable to redemption 

 in silver. Still there is a moral taint about even these. The 

 procedure was a "shoving" of a debased standard upon the valu- 

 ation of a class of securities which every consideration of pru- 

 dence, sound finance, and far-sighted economy should have induced 

 Congress to keep up to the best possible standard. The bonds 

 of the United States are chiefly used for those investments which 

 ought to be the least liable to fluctuation in value, and the most 

 sui'e of full payment without rebate at maturity. To speak more 

 in detail, they are security for the payment of the notes\}Of Na- 

 tional Banks, which ai'e in the pocket of every man who is able 

 to buy his bread : they are the form which idle funds often take 

 while waiting for the demands of trade : they are the best and 

 most proper investment of trust funds and the savings of myriads 

 of poor people to whom security is of more importance than high 

 interest: they are the best "gilt-edgecl" security for loans by the 

 deposit of which money can be borrowed at the lowest rate of 

 interest. To debase the ultimate valuation of these bonds was 

 to introduce the saaie vice into them which has heretofore clouded 

 the name of American finance — paying debts in a bad currency 

 and instability of value : and the infection was introduced jusfc 

 where it should have been most carefully fended off. 



The views which were entertained by the opponents of the 

 Bland bill as to its tendencies and ultimate effects agreed as to 

 generalities though differing as to details. It was patent that 

 unless the Government restricted the coinage and monopolized 



