J.—PSYCHOLOGY 175 
actually seen, any more than the thinghood with which the orange is 
invested in our thought. Apart from the shape and colour, all the rest 
comes from other experience than visual. ‘The simplest case of visual 
perception is illustrated by a coloured figure, in which (except for thing- 
hood) the experience is wholly visual ; and here analysis gives shape and 
colour as elements. It has been objected that such analysis destroys the 
mental ‘ whole’ which is so analysed, just as chemical analysis destroys 
the compound, or anatomical dissection the preparation ; and this would 
be still more true did the anatomist separate living structures. He could 
not, by merely bringing them together again, restore the organism, any 
more than the chemist, by merely adding his elements together, could 
recreate the compound. And, indeed, even though we are unable to 
separate one sensation from another in a percept, and can only distin- 
guish them in our thought, this objection holds good. For, if we think 
the sensations separately, and then attempt to add them together con- 
ceptually, we discover that the mere sum of sensations is not the equivalent 
of the percept. This objection has been urged particularly against the 
work of the introspectionist schools, as if they were concerned only to 
find the mental elements out of which all consciousness was once supposed 
to be compacted. But introspection has discovered more than the mere 
sensations that have been distinguished. It has found relations which 
obtain between the sensations, as well as relations obtaining between 
abstract concepts, and between concepts and percepts also. This dis- 
covery is one of the most fruitful of all the empirical observations of 
psychology. A similar consideration might be developed in respect of 
the psychology of volitional processes. The Louvain school, for instance, 
like that of Wiirzburg, analyses the elements that enter into processes of 
resolution and attainment, and of choice. But it would be a mistake to 
think that these elements, so analysed, when conceptually put together 
again, are the equivalents of the will-processes. Here also are discovered 
relations which obtain between them; and among these is that most 
important of all real relations, the relation, namely, of cause, which is so 
closely identifiable with the self. It is in virtue of this relation that a 
will-act from beginning to end is constituted as a temporal whole. If 
one keeps in mind the fact that both in spatial and temporal ‘ wholes ’ 
neither the sensory and volitional elements nor the relations occur in 
isolation, this procedure of structural analysis is fully justified. 
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS. 
A further step is to discover by functional analysis the conditions or 
laws of occurrence of the various events with which the science is con- 
cerned. In psychology, this has meant in the past the attempt to relate 
physical stimuli and their intensities with psychological occurrences, 
as in the case of Weber’s Law; or to relate physiological events with 
psychological ones, as in the localisation of sensory and motor functions 
in definite areas of the cortex, or conative and emotional changes with 
the physiological disturbances indicated by the pneumograph, sphygmo- 
graph or psychogalvanometer. ‘The establishing of such relations between 
physical properties and physiological processes, on the one hand, and 
