F.— ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND STATISTICS 145 



leaving his client to decide whether X, Y, Z ... is a state of affairs 

 which he wishes to bring about. This formulation is in manifest conflict 

 with the actual practice of economists. If the methodologist urges that 

 this ought to be their actual practice, he trespasses beyond his proper 

 province, which has already been defined. Also this formulation claims 

 both too much and too little. 



It claims too much because it gives an exaggerated idea of the 

 economist's power of prediction at the present juncture. It claims too 

 little because it entails that his advisory power is confined within the narrow 

 limits of his predictory power. Moreover it would make him present his 

 information in a form in which it would be of no use to his client. 



Suppose, for instance, an import duty on what is under consideration. 

 He may feel confident that this will cause the price of wheat and wheaten 

 bread within the country to be higher than it would otherwise be. He 

 knows also that the duty will have effects on the prices of other com- 

 modities, on the incomes of various classes, on the foreign exchanges and 

 the circulation of money. But he cannot put these effects into quantitative 

 terms and in some cases he may not know the direction of the conse- 

 quential movements. To do so he would have to have much more detailed 

 causal laws at his disposal than there is any immediate prospect of his 

 having. 



But even if he could know all these things, his advice would still be in 

 a form of little use to his client. Having heard all the prospective charges, 

 the client will want to know whether the last state of affairs is in sum 

 better or worse than the first and will be unable by his unaided intelligence 

 to decide. 



By resorting to his analytical map, presently to be described, the 

 economist may be able to come by a short cut to the required answer. 

 He may be able to say outright and with substantial authority that on the 

 whole the individuals of the community will be in a worse position, even 

 although his power of predicting the actual course of prices and incornes 

 is negligible. Any definition of the economist's advisory scope, which 

 does not recognise this, is unrealistic and fails to do justice to the use- 

 fulness of the economist even with his present limited powers. 



Strictures upon the economist's proneness to give advice come also 

 from another quarter — namely, politicians or moral philosophers. What 

 right, they say, has the economist to lay down that such and such ought 

 to be done, since this depends in part upon the ends sought ? Sure! 

 the economist must wait until the ends are furnished to him by the 

 politician. This criticism is not valid. 



The economist is entitled to his criterion of individual preference. 

 The politician may then say to him, ' I am not so much interested in indi- 

 viduals getting what they prefer, as in the country being self-sufficient. 

 What I want to know is how to achieve this.' But there are an infinite 

 number of ways of achieving it. Which shall the economist prescribe } 

 The politician may add : ' Oh, well, I want to do it in the most economical 

 way.' The economist then interprets this as meaning that subject to the 

 overriding condition of self-sufficiency, individuals are to get what they 

 prefer. Without his own criterion he cannot choose among the infinite 



