136 REPORT—1858. 
logists are willing to allow. Doubts having long rested on his mind upon this point, 
the author had made a series of experiments, which, together with those of Pfliiger, 
had led him to a clear conviction. 
Before detailing the evidence for the sensorial functions of the chord, it will be 
necessary to fix on some broad and palpable signs, such as unequivocally indicate the 
presence of volition. We have such signs in spontaneity of actions and choice of 
actions. It will scarcely be disputed that an animal manifests volition—and its act 
is voluntary—when the act occurs spontaneously. By “spontaneously,” I mean 
prompted by some inward impulse, and not excited by an outward stimulus. Spon- 
taneity and choice are two palpable characteristics of sensation and volition, and it 
is these we must seek in our experiments. Those who for the first time perform, or 
witness, experiments on decapitated animals, find it very difficult to believe that these 
animals have no sensation ; but their doubts are generally settled by a reference to 
the admitted hypothesis of the brain being the exclusive seat. of consciousness. On 
the strength of this hypothesis, the striking facts recorded by Legallois, Prochaska, 
Volkmann, and others, have been explained as simple cases of the reflex action of the 
chord. Against this hypothesis of the brain being the exclusive seat of conscious- 
ness, I have for some years gathered increasing strength of conviction, preferring the 
hypothesis of the sensorium being co-extensive with the whole of the nervous centres. 
From the mass of evidence furnished by experiments, all bearing on the same point, 
the sensational function of the chord acquires in my mind the force almost of a 
demonstrated truth. From that mass a few cardinal cases may be selected. If they 
do not carry conviction, there can be little hope in any accumulation of such cases. 
Placea child of two or three years old on his back, and tickle his right cheek with 
a feather, he will probably first move his head aside, and then, on the tickling being 
continued, he will raise his right hand, push away the feather, and rub the tickled 
spot. So long as his right hand remains free he will never use the left hand when 
the right cheek is tickled, or vice versd. But if you hold his right hand, he will rub 
with the left. The voluntary character of these actions is indisputable, in spite of 
their uniformity ; they are prompted by sensation, and determined by volition. 
Let us now contrast the actions of the sleeping child under similar circumstances, 
and we shall find them to be precisely similar. ‘ Children,” says Pfluger, “sleep 
more soundly than adults, and seem to be more sensitive in sleep. I tickled the right 
nostril of a three-year old boy. He at once raised his right hand to push me away, 
and then rubbed the place. * When I tickled his left nostril he raised the left hand. 
I then softly drew both arms down, and laid them close to the body, imbedding the 
left arm in the clothes, and placing on it a pillow, by gentle pressure on which I 
could keep the arm down without awakening him. Having done this I tickled his 
left nostril. He at once began to move the imprisoned arm, but could not reach his 
face with it, because I held it firmly though gently down. He now drew his head 
aside, and I continued tickling, whereupon he raised the right hand, and with it 
rubbed the left nostril, an action he never performed when the left hand was free.”’ 
This simple and ingenious experiment of Pfliiger establishes one important point, 
namely, that the so-called reflex actions in sleep are not unaccompanied by sensation 
and volition. The sleeping child behaves precisely as the waking child behaves, ex- 
cept that his actions are less energetic; and we are forced to assume the presence of 
dim cerebral consciousness to escape the conclusion that the spinal chord is also a 
seat of consciousness. The actions of the sleeping and the waking child are so 
similar, that both must be credited with sensation and volition (and if not both, then 
neither must be so credited) ; in like manner I.shal] show that the actions of animals 
before and after decapitation exhibit no more difference, as respects sensibility, than 
the actions of the waking and the sleeping child; so that here again, unless both 
actions are credited with sensation and volition, neither of them can put in a claim. 
Experiment leads decisively to this alternative, namely, either animals are uncon- 
scious machines, or decapitated animals manifest sensibility and will. [Having 
detailed a series of experiments with a water newt, to show that the animal’s actions 
were precisely the same before and after decapitation, and arguing that they dis- 
played spontaneity of action—the paper proceeded. ]—After allowing a quarter of 
an hour to elapse, in order to a more complete reinstatement of vigour, I touched 
the flank as before, with acetic acid. The movements at first were very disorderlys 
