472 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
something to fix the attention, but we can study mind only in Consciousness, and it is 
entirely out of our power to form any notion of the nature or attributes of unconscious 
mind. 
30. Consciousness, in its action, involves duration, or Time. Every conscious process 
has a beginning, an advance, and an end. ‘The relations of the Subjective, are therefore 
relations in time,—the origin of the relation determining the chronological antecedent,— 
and the termination of the relation, the chronological consequent. 
31. In the Objective-Subjective relation, the impulse commencing externally and termi- 
nating in Consciousness, our attention is aroused, and we are induced to exercise our activity 
in various ways. To this form of Consciousness, which corresponds very nearly to the Pas- 
sion (dpc) of Pythagoras, the name of Passivity or Receptivity might be given, to desig- 
nate the condition of the mind as the recipient of an impulse not originating in itself. ° 
But as the simplest exercise of Consciousness involves some degree of activity, and as the 
aroused attention tends to incite increased activity, the term Moriviry seems more appro- 
priate. 
32. In the Subjective-Subjective relation, the impulse begins and ends within Con- 
sciousness, which is said to act “of its own accord,” or “spontaneously.” I propose to 
designate this form of the subjective by the term SronTaNeEIrTyY. 
33. In the Subjective-Objective relation, we are subjectively conscious of an effort com- 
mencing in our own minds, but tending towards the objective, an effort to perceive, know, 
understand, the nature of the object, or the proper mode of using it to accomplish some 
particular end that we have in view. ‘This is especially an Intellectual or Rational effort, 
and the term RationALity seems peculiarly fit for the form of Consciousness in which this 
effort originates.* . 
34. It is extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to bring this primary division 
of Consciousness purely under our observation, because we can never observe the mind 
when it is merely motive, spontaneous, or rational. ‘The very effort of observing involves 
a subjective exercise of Spontaneity and Rationality, and renders the mind while using its 
subjective energies, the object of its own observation. The effort to penetrate this laby- 
rinth of complicated objective and subjective influences is perplexing, but no more so than 
* T do not remember to have scen the boundaries of the primary divisions of Consciousness more clearly indi- 
cated, than by Mahan (p. 15), who employs the terms, “Intellect or Intelligence, Sensibility or Sensitivity, and 
Will. To the Intellect we refer all the phenomena of thought, of every kind, degree, and modification. ‘To the 
Sensibility we refer all feedings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, and affections. To the Will we refer all 
mental determinations, such as yolitions, choices, purposes, &c.” Although this division, which is based upon 
pure observation, does not precisely correspond with our own, the resemblance is sufficiently striking to afford a 
very satisfactory confirmation of our theory. 
