476 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
(©) ist AL 12 dM lege Ie Il 
PRIMARY FACULTIES. 
_ 43, AuTHouGH metaphysical writers have generally turned their attention almost exclu- 
sively to the rational phenomena, they have often recognized both the motive and the 
spontaneous element of Consciousness. ‘The following are some of the prominent terms 
that philosophers have employed, to designate mental states that they have specially ob- 
served, with the symbol attached to each that seems most precisely to indicate its meaning: 
Propensity (MM), Instinct (SM), Perception (RM), 
Desire (MS), Will (SS), Judgment (RS), 
Sentiment (MR), Energy (SR), Understanding (RR). 
44, In order to determine the correctness of this relative assignment, it may be well to 
examine each of the terms somewhat carefully. 
45. PROPENSITY, as defined by Webster, denotes “bent of mind, natural or acquired ; 
inclination ; natural tendency.” 
46. Comte, treating of the phrenological subdivision of the affective faculties into pro- 
pensities and sentiments, says that “the first and fundamental class” [propensities] ‘“ re- 
lates to the individual alone, or at most, to the family, regarded successively in its princi- 
pal needs of preservation, such as reproduction, the rearing of the young, the mode of 
alimentation, of habitation,” &c.* 
47. Combe says, “ All the propensities are blind,” and “the faculties of the propensities 
and sentiments cannot be excited to activity directly by a mere act of the will,” but “ each 
faculty may be roused into activity by the presentment of its appropriate objects.” + 
48. Whatever we may think of the comparative accuracy of these several definitions, 
there can be little doubt that their authors regarded Propensity as directly subject to an 
external, objective stimulus, and it may, therefore, be ranked unhesitatingly under Mo- 
tivity. Inasmuch as it denotes a mere tendency, without any perceptible (quantitative) 
element of Spontaneity or Rationality, it may well be regarded as the simplest or motive 
form of Motivity (Motivity affected), the symbol of which is MM. 
49, DesiRE, “even when its object is some action of our own, is only an incitement to 
will, but it is not volition.”"{ (Motivity, but not Spontaneity, though somewhat like it.) 
* Positive Philosophy, pp. 389-390. + Lect. on Phrenology, pp. 140, 277, 278. 
{ Reid, p. 532. 
