PRIMARY FACULTIES. 477 
50. “The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything, whose pre- 
sent enjoyment carries the sense of delight with it, is that we call desire.”* 
ol. “That which immediately determines the will from time to time, to every voluntary 
action, is the uneasiness of desire fixed on some absent good.’* 
52. The symbol MS accords well with these definitions, denoting Motivity with a 
special tendency to voluntary or spontaneous action. 
53. SENTIMENT “supposes the existence of some social relations, either among indi- 
viduals of a different species, or especially between individuals of the same species apart 
from sex, and determines the character which the tendencies of the animal must impress 
on each of these relations, whether transient or permanent.” + 
54. “ Authors who place moral approbation in feeling only, very often use the word 
Sentiment, to express feeling without judgment. ‘This I take likewise to be an abuse of a 
word. Our moral determinations may, with propriety, be called moral sentiments ; for the 
word sentiment, in the English language, never as I conceive, signifies mere feeling, but 
Judgment accompanied with feeling.”{ (Say rather, feeling implying or suggesting the 
idea of judgment.) 
55. These definitions justify us in regarding Sentiment as a feeling or affection of Con- 
sciousness, excited by any appropriate object, and tending to produce action in accord- 
ance with our position as social and rational beings. It therefore represents Motivity, 
tending towards subjective action with a rational object or end, and its appropriate symbol 
is MR. 
56. Lysrinct, as defined by Reid, is “a natural blind impulse to certain actions, with- 
out having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception 
of what we do.” This is exemplified in “ that natural instinct by which a man who has 
lost his balance and begins to fall, makes a sudden effort to recover himself, without any 
intention or deliberation.”§ 
57. Hamilton says, “ An Instinct is an agent which proposes blindly and ignorantly, a 
work of intelligence and knowledge.” 
58. Comte, in noticing the relation of intelligence to instinct, observes that “the only 
meaning that can be attached to the word instinct, is any spontaneous impulse] in a de- 
terminate direction, independently of any foreign influence. In this primitive sense, the 
* Locke, v. 1, pp. 149 and 160. + Comte, p. 390. : 
{ Reid, p. 674. On this paragraph, Sir William Hamilton remarks: ‘This is too unqualified an assertion. 
The term Sentiment is in Huglish applied to the higher feelings.” 
§ Reid, p. 568. || Reid, p. 761. 
§| Spontaneous impulse — Spontaneity-Motive, SM. 
