478 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
term evidently applies to the proper and direct activity of any faculty whatever, intellec- 
tual as well as affective, and it therefore does not conflict with the term zntelligence in any 
way, as we so often see when we speak of those who without any education, manifest a 
marked talent for music, painting, mathematics, &c. In this way there is instinct, or 
rather there are instincts in man as much or more than in brutes.”* 
59. We may infer from the foregoing definitions, that the prominent or general charac- 
teristic of Instinct, is a tendency to spontaneous action, while the secondary or specific 
characteristic, is “a natural blind impulse,” analogous to Propensity. If this impulse was 
considered as the most obvious feature of Instinct, its symbol would be MS, but if, as I 
believe, the first idea suggested by the term, is that of some kind of active potentiality, it 
represents the motive form of Spontaneity, and its symbol is SM. It will be found both 
interesting and useful, to observe the analogy and the quantitative distinction between 
Desire and Instinct,—the spontaneous-motivity and the motive-spontaneity,—the elements 
of each being the same, but Motivity being more prominent in the former, and Sponta- 
neity in the latter. 
60. WILL is so purely subjective, that its place may be assigned without hesitation 
under Spontaneity, of which it may be regarded as the spontaneous form, and its symbol 
is therefore SS. 
61. It is difficult by any definition, to describe a faculty that is so familiar to every 
one by its constant action, so as to give any clearer idea of its limits, than we obtain by 
the very position we have given it in our schema, as the subjective, absolute, or spontane- 
ous form of the subjective-subjective. 
62. Bacon says: “The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, 
is of two kinds; the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the other his will, 
appetite, and affection; whereof the former produceth direction or desire, the latter action 
or execution.” > 
63. Locke says: “This at least I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to 
begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our mind and emotions of our bodies, 
barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or as it were, commanding the 
doing or not doing such or such a particular action. This power which the mind has 
thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it, or to prefer 
the emotion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versd, in any particular instance, 
is that which we call the will.” 
64. According to Reid, “ Every man is conscious of a power to determine, in things 
* Comte, pp. 385-6. Taylor, Hlements of Thought, p. 105, thinks that Instinct “cannot be imagined to reside 
in the animal.” 
+ Bacon’s Works, Vol. I, p. 206. t Locke, B. 2, ¢. 21, § 5. 
