480 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
70. Energy, therefore, in ordinary philosophical diction, as well as by common usage, 
seems to involve, 
1. The power of subjective activity, or Spontaneity ; 
2. The power of directing subjective activity to a special or rational end. It is, then, 
the faculty of Spontaneity-rational, and its symbol is SR. 
71. Rationality being, as we have already stated, specially concerned with the acquisi- 
tion of knowledge, its subordinate faculties should be adapted to every possible method of 
acquisition. 
72. Now Rationality may attain its end in three, and only three ways, viz.: 
1. By the acquisition of new facts,—the rational Mer affected by the Nor ME. 
2. By combining or comparing two or more facts, drawn from the storehouse of Con- 
sciousness, in order to discover new forms of truth from their relations, the Rational Mr 
acting within or upon itself. 
3. By the examination of facts or conclusions, for the intelligent determination of their 
full objective meaning,—the Rational ME overstepping the bounds of experience, todeclare . 
the reality of the Nor ME. 
73. In the acquisition of new facts, the rational Consciousness is sub-passive and re- 
ceptive, influenced by the objective, and simply percipient of the fact which is presented 
for its cognizance. ‘This motive form of Rationality is usually called PErcertion. 
74. In comparing the facts which, either by original constitution or by appropriation, 
have become a portion of its own treasury of knowledge, the rational Consciousness is 
specially subjective, its action originating and terminating within its own borders. This 
spontaneous form of Rationality has the same characteristics as the faculty of Jup@MEnr. 
75. In ascertaining objective significance, the subjective Rationality assumes an objec- 
tive tendency, and is evidently in its affecting or rational form. This form corresponds to 
the faculty of UNDERSTANDING. 
76. Perception is confounded by Locke with thinking, and with the act of the Under- 
standing.* 
He remarks, however, that “thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, 
signifies that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active ; 
when it, with some degree of voluntary attention, considers anything. For in bare, naked 
perception, the mind is for the most part, only passive, and what it perceives, it cannot 
avoid perceiving.” t 
77. Kant defines perception as “ empirical consciousness,” and he remarks that phe- 
nomena, as objects of perception, “ contain in themselves, besides the intuition, also matter 
for an object in general (whereby something existing in space or time is represented).”’{ 
* Essay, Vol. I, pp. 90, 98, 152. + Ibid. p. 98. { Hayward’s translation, p. 138. 
