PRIMARY FACULTIES. 481 
78. Reid says perception “hath always an object distinct from the act by which it is 
perceived ; an object which may exist, whether it be perceived or not.’* 
79. Combe regards perception as the act of a faculty which recognizes an object on pre- 
sentation,—‘ the lowest degree of activity of the intellectual faculties.” 
80. Hamilton says: “ External Perception or Perception simply, is the faculty presenta- 
tive or intuitive of the phenomena of the Non-Ego or Matter,—if there be any intuitive 
apprehension allowed of the Non-Ego at all. Internal Perception or Self- Consciousness is 
the faculty presentative or intuitive of the phenomena of the Ego or Mind.”$ 
81. We infer, therefore, that philosophers unite in regarding perception, 
1. As a subjective-objective or rational faculty. 
2. As sub-passive, empirical, active in the lowest degree, tending to incite rationality to 
greater activity,—attributes which should characterize Rationality-motive. We are there- 
fore confirmed in our previous assignment of its position, as the representative of the 
symbol RM. 
82. JupeMENT is undoubtedly a rational faculty, involving a special active exercise of 
our subjective powers, such as should belong to the absolute or spontaneous form of Ra- 
tionality. Its symbol is therefore RS. Compare this localization with the following defi- 
nitions. 
&3. “The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain 
knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is judgment; whereby the mind takes 
its ideas to agree or disagree, or which is the same, any proposition to be true or false, 
without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proof.§ 
84. “Judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree, by the inter- 
vention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or disagreement with them it does 
not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual.”|| 
85. “ Judgment is, therefore, the mediate cognition of an object, consequently the repre- 
sentation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a conception, which is 
valid for many, and under such many comprehends also a given representation, which last 
thing then is referred immediately to the object. . . . But we can reduce all actions of 
the Understanding to judgments, so that the Understanding in general can be represented 
as a faculty of Judging.” 4] 
86. “The definition commonly given of judgment, by the more ancient writers in logic 
* Reid, p. 183. + Op. citat., p. 284. 
{ Reid, Note B, § I, 8, p. 809. § Locke, v. 2, p. 427. 
|| Locke, v. 2, p. 445. 4 Kant, p. 61. 
