494 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
divisions of Consciousness. The fourth order of subdivision is omitted, as the nomencla- 
ture I have suggested is a wholly experimental one, requiring a long series of careful 
observations before it will be possible to determine whether it has any value. The facul- 
ties of the third order are marked with a note of interrogation, to show that farther study 
is desirable, to ascertain whether their relative assignment is the best that can be made. 
It is quite probable that some other order of classification may be more convenient for the 
lower faculties, but I have thought it would be best to show that the principle of tricho- 
tomy may be extended as far as the needs of science may require. 
CHAPTER IV. 
PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
127. Every man feels that his personality does not consist in any peculiarity of form, 
feature, or complexion, any more than in the shape or texture of the clothes he wears. 
He finds his body with its limbs and organs of sense, a very convenient and important 
instrument for the execution of his plans, and he may take pride in the physical beauty, 
delicacy, or exquisite finish of that instrument, as he would in the symmetry of a horse, 
or the superior merit of anything else of which he claimed ownership. But the intelligent 
self,—the Me,—sits apart in such almost inaccessible majesty, that many have been accus- 
tomed to look upon it as a kind of mythical somewhat, whose very existence is exceed- 
ingly problematical,—a mere resultant, perhaps, of the material and physical organization. 
Such an opinion is of course based upon the assumption that the material is more patent 
and intelligible than the immaterial,—an assumption that it may be well to test by a brief 
inquiry into the character of our knowledge of the nature and qualities of mind. 
128. Of the essential nature of mind or matter we know nothing. We can judge of 
them only by the effects they produce upon us by their properties or attributes. These 
attributes can be considered as belonging to them only in so far as they are phenomenal, 
that is to say, as they appear to our observation. What analogy or connection there may 
be between the phenomenal attributes and the substantial essence, it is impossible, for 
reasons that will appear in the course of our inquiry, for us to determine. It is, however, 
obvious that the phenomena of mind are more closely related to the observing mind, than 
the phenomena of matter. We ought therefore to know more of mind than of matter, 
and inasmuch as we know nothing of matter except the effects it produces upon our 
minds, Bishop Berkely and others have attempted with much force and plausibility of 
