496 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
Thought, . . as Cause and Effect, or as Essential and Accidental. If any such relation 
between the two be assumed, this is not done in consequence of practical self-observation, 
and it does not lie in the fact of Consciousness. 
132. . . “Should such a relation be assumed upon some other ground than that of 
self-observation, . . then it appears at first sight, that the two elements, as coexistent 
and inseparable from each other, must be held to be of equal rank; and thus the inward 
thought may be as well regarded as the foundation, the essence of the outward perception, 
which in that case would be the superstructure, the accident, as the reverse; and in this 
way an insoluble doubt would necessarily arise between the two suppositions, which would 
forever prevent any final decision respecting the assumed relation. . . But should any one 
look deeper into the matter, . . inasmuch as the inward consciousness embraces even the 
outward sense itself; since we are conscious of the seeing, hearing, or feeling, but can by 
no means, on the other hand, see, hear, or feel our consciousness ; and thus, even in the 
immediate fact, Consciousness assumes the higher place,—such an one, I say, would find it 
much more natural to make the internal Consciousness the chief thing, and the external 
Sense the subordinate thing; and to explain the latter by the former; to control and try 
the latter by the former ;—and not the reverse.” 
133. Either Cousin or Hamilton might have thus discoursed, for each of them main- 
tains the supremacy and efficiency of Consciousness,—the subordination of Sensation,— 
and the relation of the latter as the chronological, to the former as its logical antecedent. 
Each rejects the theory of Locke, that all our knowledge is derived from sensation and 
experience, and acknowledges the transcendency of ideas, which alone render sensation 
and experience possible. 
134. There is much in a superficial acquaintance with metaphysical literature, that 
tends to discourage the ardent seeker after truth, and to strengthen the vulgar opinion 
that all philosophical research is foolish and unsatisfactory. The pages of an ordinary 
Encyclopedia will show that in the earliest historical times, the Brahminical sages taught 
many of the leading doctrines that characterize some of the most distinguished modern 
philosophical schools. A cursory perusal of the works of Plato and Aristotle reveals the 
origin of so much of the variety and profundity of thought that later writers would 
gladly claim as their own, that one is tempted to exclaim with Solomon, “ there is nothing 
new under the sun,” and to believe that in what poor, weak, deluded humanity regards as 
the most exalted sphere of investigation, it is destined to move in a continual circle, 
making no real progress, but constantly repeating the ideas and systems of earlier ages. 
135. But if our metaphysical reading is more than superficial, much of this discourage- 
ment will vanish, giving place to a hope, if not to a full conviction, that the day will come 
when the science of all science will assume a clearness and a definiteness such as it merits. 
