PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 499 
gress in knowledge. These facts, as soon as they are appropriated, excite curiosity, or a 
desire to know more. This Curiosity is a stimulus to mental exertion. 
143. Influenced by the awakened stimulus, the mind acts somewhat blindly and con- 
fusedly at first, yet sufficiently to show that it has in itself an inherent and independent 
power of action. In the simple exercise of his active powers, without any definite object 
or aim other than the gratification of a capricious will, the child finds an inexhaustible 
source of enjoyment. 
144, As mental development proceeds, we become conscious of a higher power than 
that of mere activity,—the power of intelligence, which involves the comprehension of 
truths, relations, and laws. 
145. Hence we are naturally led to the study of Consciousness under three distinct 
forms of manifestation : 
1. As a stimulus to exertion, acted upon by external influences. ‘To this form of Con- 
sciousness we have given the name of Moriviry. 
2. As acting of its own accord, free from any extraneous impulse, and stimulated only 
by its own conscious Motivity. ‘To this form of Consciousness we have given the name of 
SPONTANEITY. 
3, As operating intelligently for the discovery of truth. This third and highest form 
of Consciousness, to which Motivity and Spontaneity should be both subservient, we have 
called RATIONALITY. 
146. If this division is admitted as being founded in necessity, or even as being natural 
or appropriate, it is desirable that the respective limits of the three Conscious Forms 
should be clearly defined and understood, and that we should carefully avoid attributing 
to either, an influence which it does not properly possess. 
147. We might for instance, naturally suppose that Motivity is subject to the direct 
supervision of Spontaneity and Rationality, and that therefore it may sometimes be sub- 
jective both in origin and tendency. Indeed, it may be asked, if our motives are not thus 
under our control, how is it possible to believe or imagine that we are in any way account- 
able for our actions ? 
148. In answer to this question it may be remarked, that we rarely attach any sense of 
responsibility to our motives, but only to the acts themselves, so far as they are sponta- 
neous or voluntary. All our motives are good, if they are not allowed an undue authority, 
and it is a part of the province of Spontaneity, aided by Rationality, to determine the 
amount of influence that we will accord to each. The question of responsibility does not 
concern creatures of blind fate or necessity, and it can have no reference to man so long 
as he is irresistibly impelled by any external force, but so soon as he is able to withstand 
the impulse, and he begins to deliberate, he becomes accountable. In the majority of 
