500 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
cases we are urged by two or more motives acting simultaneously. We may for instance 
feel at the same moment, an inclination to physical exertion, a desire to employ that exer- 
tion in appropriating something to our own use, and a conscientious conviction that the 
appropriation would be wrong, because the article desired is already the property of 
another. No blame can be attached to us for either of these three motives, but if our 
Spontaneity decides to act in accordance with the inclination and desire, and in opposition 
to the conscientious conviction, we shall feel self-condemned, and responsible for the im- 
proper exercise of Spontaneity. 
149. Motivity is blind, involuntary, impulsive,—Spontaneity should be always watch- 
ful, cautious, deliberate. Motivity is never subject to our control at the moment of action, 
or in other words, we can never dictate the character of the motives that shall suggest 
themselves to us on any given occasion. No man by any effort of will or reason, can 
make the influence of all his motives such as he would like, or such as according to his 
rational convictions, it ought to be. If we desire to correct our errors, to reform our 
habits, or to alter our character, the proper way to effect the change, is by exposing Mo- 
tivity to such objective influences as will tend to strengthen or weaken its particular 
manifestations. 
150. Spontaneity and Rationality can act on Motivity only indirectly. If Spontaneity 
is sufficiently strong or deliberate to resist in a single instance, a motive which from indul- 
gence has acquired undue strength, the motive will be weakened, and each new successful 
resistance will diminish its influence in a greater degree, until finally it will cease to 
operate improperly. In like manner, a motive that is too feeble, may be made efficient 
by a strong or deliberate volition, and by habitual exercise, it may be strengthened to any 
desirable extent. In these cases, Spontaneity does not act on Motivity, but in its proper 
sphere of restraining our impetuosity, and calling upon Rationality to deliberate between 
our varying inclinations, it provides a way by which Motivity may receive the proper ob- 
jective bias. 
151. If Spontaneity is weak, so that under the influence of strong Motivity it becomes 
precipitate, virtuous sentiments and desires will still exist, however feeble, and. Sponta- 
neity may strengthen them,—increasing at the same time its own efficiency,—by forming 
the habit of deliberate circumspection, by avoiding temptation, and by seeking proper 
employment, suitable associates, and such other circumstantial aids as Rationality may 
suggest, or the sense of duty may indicate. 
152. It is doubtful whether there is ever any action of Spontaneity without a motive. 
In most cases, indeed, in all cases that involve any question of moral right or wrong, a 
variety of motives are presented in connection. If they all incline to the same course of 
procedure, Spontaneity will act instantaneously. If there is a conflict among them, 
