PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 501 
Spontaneity has the power, and it should exercise the power, of waiting for deliberation. 
If proper deliberation is used, its final action will always be in accordance with the con- 
scientious motive, and with the convictions of Rationality. 
153. In these powers of Spontaneity consists our Freedom of Will. We may not be 
free to act without motives, or contrary to our motives, or even contrary to the strongest 
motive. But we have the power of discerning in all cases which ought to be the strongest 
motive,—the power in most cases, of deliberating between conflicting motives, and delay- 
ing the too violent (and therefore vicious), until the feebler virtuous motive can assert its 
supremacy, thus determining which s/al/ be the strongest motive,—and the power of ex- 
posing ourselves to external influences that will operate on our Motivity for the formation 
of virtuous habits. For the proper exercise of these powers, we undoubtedly are, as we 
feel ourselves to be, responsible and accountable. 
154. As upon a cursory view, the action of Motivity sometimes seems to have a subjec- 
tive origin, so may the tendency of Spontaneity often appear objective. Indeed, most of 
our actions are upon objects,—the very brain that we use as the organ of thought, the 
nerves that convey our physical volitions, and the muscles that serve as the instruments of 
our will, being objective when considered in their relations to the mind. 
155. But the tendency and end of Spontaneity considered in itself, is merely our per- 
sonal gratification. Considered simply as active beings, we are conscious of nothing but 
our activity, which is purely subjective. Rationality alone.can take note of any external 
objects, or declare that our exertions produce any objective effect, and it is only because 
of the intimate connection of Rationality and Spontaneity,—part of the province of the 
latter, in aiding its own determinations, being to call for the decisions of the former,— 
that we could ever suppose Spontaneity to be, like Rationality, subjective-objective. 
156. We have said that Spontaneity should be deliberate. By this we mean that 
Spontaneity should call Rationality to its aid, on every occasion of conflicting motives. 
Deliberation is not one of the offices of Spontaneity, except inasmuch as it involves the 
faculty of attention, but under the influence of the conscientious motive that declares the 
duty of deliberation, Spontaneity may become attentive, and excite Rationality to delibe- 
rate. Rationality is the judicial, Spontaneity the executive power. The former expounds 
and interprets laws that are based upon eternal necessity, and revealed by Divine Benevo- 
lence,—the latter, when in the proper performance of its functions, governs all its opera- 
tions by those laws. 
157. Here again we have another apparent tendency inconsistent with our principles. 
If Rationality decides, and Spontaneity acts according to the decision, it may appear that 
Rationality tends to determine the exercise of Spontaneity, and is therefore subjective- 
subjective. But if we reflect, we shall perceive that Spontaneity has determined, before 
