502 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
appealing to the tribunal of Reason, to act in accordance with the motive which ought to 
be the strongest,.according to the convictions of Rationality. Rationality makes its objec- 
tive decision on the questions propounded to it by Spontaneity, and its office is then ac- 
complished. Spontaneity makes use of the decision, and if its determination has not been 
changed in the meanwhile by a new intervention of Motivity, calling for a new exercise 
of its powers, it makes that the strongest, which might otherwise have been the weakest 
motive. 
158. The immediate origin of Rational action sometimes appears objective. In percep- 
tion through the senses, if we regard Perception as a rational faculty, it is not always easy 
to perceive any intermediate action of Motivity or Spontaneity, between the physical 
impression upon the nerves, and the intelligent perception. But if we examine closely, 
we shall probably find that in every instance, the spontaneous faculty of attention is 
aroused, before any perception can take place.* If the attention is wholly absorbed, 
pictures of passing objects may be painted upon the retina in the most glowing colors, the 
waves of sound from the most soul-thrilling melodies, may beat their tattoo on the drum 
of the ear, the pores of the sensitive skin may be closed by cold, or opened by sweltering 
heat, without exciting perception, the impression upon the consciousness being insufficient 
to divert the action of Spontaneity, so that Rationality may assign to the impression an 
objective validity. If amidst this absorption, we are suddenly startled,—as for instance, 
by a vivid flash of lightning, the near report of a cannon, or a violent blow,—we have 
first a confused consciousness of disturbance, to which succeed a motive desire to under- 
stand the cause of the disturbance, and a spontaneous act changing the direction of the 
faculty of attention, followed immediately by a rational objective perception. 
159. In every instance of the recognition of a physical object, the process appears there- 
fore to be,—first, an impression on the brain through the nerves,—second, if this impres- 
sion is sufficiently strong, a simple and at first confused consciousness of that impression, 
exciting Spontaneity through the intervention of Motivity,—third, a rational perception 
of an object. Between. the objective impression and the objective determination of Reason, 
an objective-subjective act must invariably and necessarily be interposed, otherwise the 
action would be merely objective-objective, and as such it would be entirely excluded 
from the sphere of Consciousness. 
160. Because perception follows the impression on the sensitive nerves, without any 
apparent interval, it is not strange that we should think it impossible for any other mental 
* St. Jerome, quoted by Sir William Hamilton, Reid’s Works, p. 877, says: “(Quod mens videat et mens 
audiat, et quod nec audire quidpiam nec videre possumus, nisi sensus in ea que cernimus ¢ndentus, vetus sententia.” 
Sir William Hamilton makes “an act of Attention, however remiss,”’ the first condition of perception. 
