PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 503 
operation to intervene. But when we observe the rapid movement of the fingers in a 
skilful pianist, or the marvellous facility of computation in an experienced accountant, 
and reflect that each motion, and each addition, requires a distinct volition, we may readily 
conceive that Motivity and Spontaneity may have time to act between the consciousness 
of the sensible impression, and the perception of the object from which that impression 
originated. And if we watch the earliest developments of the perceptive powers in an 
infant, we can hardly fail to be convinced that a desire to interpret the unknown affection 
of Consciousness, precedes every distinct perception. If we find such a precedence in but 
a single instance, it will furnish a strong presumption that the order we have indicated is the 
natural one, and that it is only because it is habitual, that we fail to detect it in every case. 
161. However philosophical the division of Consciousness into Motivity, Spontaneity, 
and Rationality may be, as a basis for the classification of the mental faculties, the division 
is one, as we have seen, that can never fall purely under our observation, but it is rather 
a rational determination a priori of necessary states, like our conception of matter, which 
is derived from the consideration of mixed and varying phenomena or qualities. Our 
ideas of the three Conscious-forms may however be made more distinct, definite, and ade- 
quate, than our ideas of matter or its primary attributes, and therefore the science of mind 
has a more impregnable foundation than that of matter. Whether upon that foundation 
a metaphysical superstructure will ever be erected, more beautiful and complete than 
our present congeries of physical sciences, is a question for the future to solve. 
162. Consciousness is so far a rule to itself—the mind is so multiform in its infinite 
variety of capability, that we might plausibly demand even more latitude in our attempts 
at defining and comprehending its divers characteristics, than we so readily allow to every 
student of the more precisely marked forms of less versatile material nature. We havé 
however no occasion for any such demand, for the science of mind, at least in its founda- 
tion, is not only more precise and definite, but it is also more substantial than that of 
matter. We use the term substantial in its primitive meaning, as indicating an approxi- 
mation to the perception of that which underlies the phenomenal or accidental. From 
the necessary relations of the subjective and objective, we have already deduced the three 
classes of mental activity, which correspond to Motivity, Spontaneity, and Rationality. 
Does this deduction fail in any respect, of being exactly and rigorously scientific? The 
distinction into the subjective and objective is real and definite,—the four classes which 
indicate the progress of activity from its origin to its termination, are exhaustive and posi- 
tive,—the first of these four classes (the objective-objective), is of course excluded from 
any connection with the subjective, the three classes remaining are distinctly characterized, 
and harmonize wonderfully in their significance with the three modes of mental develop- 
ment. What more need we desire ? 
VOL. X11.—64 
