516 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
well as sciences of number, of matter, and of form. We may, with as much reason, hope 
to discover valuable truths by observation and experiment in one case as in another; in 
the study of any subject that has never been investigated, as in following the beaten track 
of investigation. But where shall we seek for these truths, and how shall we build upon 
them after we have laid our foundation 2 7 
218. Our earliest knowledge, and, in the opinion of a certain school of philosophers, 
our entire knowledge is obtained, either directly or indirectly, through the medium of the 
senses. Long before we are able to express our thoughts, even before we know what it is 
to think, these busy observers are at work examining the objects around us, and storing 
our minds with the results of their examination. We are required by our very nature to 
place confidence in the information that they convey, and that confidence is never mate- 
rially weakened by the experience of life, or by the arguments of theorists, who tell us we 
should not depend on the testimony of the senses, because they so often deceive us. Be- 
fore we reflect at all on the distinctions of truth and falsehood, the sensual impressions 
have become indelible; they constitute, in fact, a part of our very being,—a reality that 
we can no more deny than we can deny our own existence. It is evident, therefore, that 
we can have no assurance with regard to any portion of our experience or belief without 
relying implicitly on these early impressions. 
219. That implicit reliance we all have; it is necessary, irresistible. No arguments 
ever have been adduced, and we may be assured that none ever can be adduced, to weaken 
it. We know that the testimony of our senses is true. We know that there is some- 
thing without us that is capable of exciting certain impressions within us,—that there are 
real existences, certain qualities of which are cognizable by the sight, the feeling, the 
hearing, the smell, the taste. What is the nature of external objects, we have no means 
of knowing, and with our present faculties we shall probably never be able to ascertain. 
Much as we may dispute with regard to real essences, greatly as we may obscure and con- 
fuse our ideas by the attempt to prove that mind is but the result of organized matter, or 
that matter is but a mode of universal mind, we never in reality doubt that the external 
world has a real existence. The senses, therefore, are capable of furnishing us with posi- 
tive knowledge. 
220. Prior, in all probability, to the reception of any external impression, there is an 
internal consciousness of being. It would seem almost necessary that the infant should 
know something of itself before it begins to perceive anything exterior to itself,—at least 
the power of perceiving must have an existence (and how can it exist without being 
known) before perception can take place. But waiving the question of priority as of com- 
paratively little consequence, there are certainly facts of consciousness entirely indepen- 
dent of sensation. 
