522 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
still higher Farru, that needs none of the slow, hesitating, successive steps of demonstra- 
tion, but discerns all truth with immediate and intuitive certainty. 
242. Reason can only assure us that if the Faith be true on which our premises rest, 
the conclusion must also be true, but of the probability or certainty of the primary beliefs 
which constitute the materials of our reasoning, Faith itself is the only judge.* We may, 
however, safely rest in the assurance that the merciful Providence of an All-wise Creator 
will always vouchsafe to each of his intelligent creatures all the revelations that are essen- 
tial to his continual needs; and that if we act at each moment in accordance with the 
light that is given us, we shall not only perform the duty of the moment, but we shall 
also make continual spiritual progress,—attaining to a clearer understanding of truths that 
we have already learned, and gradually extending the sphere of our belief until it em- 
braces every vital doctrine of revelation. 
CHAPTER VIL 
RATIONAL ANTINOMIES. 
243. WHILE apparent antagonisms of Faith are, therefore, perfectly legitimate, there 
can be no legitimate antagonisms of Reason, either real or apparent. 
244. It is true that the ancient philosophers often puzzled and amused themselves with 
paradoxes, dilemmas, and paralogisms or sophisms, but even when they were unable to 
detect the fallacy, they always felt that it must arise from some unwarranted use of terms. 
No one appears to have taught that Reason could be rightfully involved in necessary and 
irreconcilable opposition, until Kant propounded his celebrated Antinomies. 
245. He says: “If we apply our Reason, not merely for the use of the principles of the 
understanding to objects of experience, but venture to extend such out beyond the limits 
of the latter,t sophistical theorems thence arise, which neither need look for confirmation 
in experience, nor fear opposition, and each of which is not only in itself without contra- 
diction, but in fact finds, in the nature of reason, conditions of its necessity, only that, un- 
* «The whole province of faith belongs objectively to reason too; for if faith made us believe what is unreason- 
able in itself, it would be an unreasonable, and therefore a false faith, and one we should be better without. Faith 
is but the advanced guard, marching onward through the territory really belonging to Reason, though not actu- 
ally occupied by it; and the broader the base of operations covered by Reason, the farther may Faith itself ad- 
yance, without danger of stumbling upon the outposts of error.” Solly, p. 16. 
+ In other words, if we try to reason upon subjects that are beyond our power of comprehension. 
