RATIONAL ANTINOMIES. 523 
fortunately, the contrary has equally as valid, and as necessary grounds of affirmation on 
its side.””* 
246. All legitimate reasoning, as we have seen, requires that the premises, as well as 
their relations, should be clearly apprehended. If we transcend the limits of possible ex- 
perience, clear apprehension becomes impossible, and as we have no means of fixing and 
defining our ideas, we are easily led into confusion and equivocation. 
247. The four Kantian antinomies furnish admirable illustrations of this truth. ‘They 
all relate to different ideas of the AxsoLtuts: 1. The Absolute completeness of the 
composition of the given whole of all phenomena; 2. The Absolute completeness of the 
division of a given whole in the phenomenon; 3. The Absolute completeness of the 
~arising of a phenomenon in general; 4. ‘The Absolute completeness of the jependensy of 
the existence of the changeable in the phenomenon.t 
248. At the very outset, we are confused by the vagueness of the term Absolute. It 
“is of a twofold (if not threefold) ambiguity, corresponding to the double (or treble) signi- 
fication of the word in Latin. 
“1, Absolutwm means what is freed or loosed, in which sense the Absolute will be what 
is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, condition, dependence, &c., and thus is tanta- 
mount to <? ézeivr of the lower Greeks. In this meaning the Absolute is not opposed to 
the Infinite. 
«2. Absolutwm means finished, perfected, completed ; in which sense the Absolute will 
be what is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect, complete, total, and thus corresponds 
to 7 du and 7 céewy of Aristotle. In this acceptation,—and it is that in which for myself 
I exclusively use it,—the Absolute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the In- 
finite. 
“Besides these two meanings, there is to be noticed the use of the word, for the most 
part in its adverbial form :—ubsolutely (absolute) in the sense of simply, simpliciter (éx2és), 
that is, considered in and for itself,—considered not in relation.” 
249. The philosophical Absolute is nearly always,—perhaps always,—considered as un- 
limited, but there is a great difference of opinion as to what constitutes a limit. Some 
regard any affirmation or negation as a limit,—others regard that as finite which has any 
qualities or attributes, and they approach the absolute by excluding all attributes. The 
highest form of simple attribution, is generally admitted to be that of Existence or Being. 
If from Being we suppose the attribute of Being to be excluded, we may call the supposed 
resultant the Absolute. But if this Absolute is anything that we can think about,—inas- 
“e 1B, BgNg), Kant, p. 295. 
2P 
t Hamilton, Discussions, p. 21. 
