« 
530 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
“THESIS. II. “ ANTITHESIS. 
“ Hvery compound substance in the world consists “No compound thing in the world consists of simple 
of simple parts, and there exists everywhere nothing parts, and there exists nothing anywhere therein sim- 
but the simple, or that which is compounded from it. ple. 
III. 
“Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not “There is no liberty, but everything in the world 
the only one from which all the phenomena of the occurs only according to laws of nature. 
world can be derived. There is, besides, a Causality 
through liberty, necessary to be admitted for the ex- 
planation of the same. 
IV. 
“Something belongs to the sensible world, which “There exists nowhere any absolutely necessary 
either as its part, or its cause, is an absolutely neces- being, neither in the world nor out of the world, as 
sary being.” its cause.” 
260. The principal ambiguities in these several Antinomies are the following : 
II. A compound may be either chemical, of things differing in sensible qualities,— 
mathematical, of things differing in position,—or immaterial, of things differing in ideal 
relations. 
III. Absolute or unlimited liberty is inconceivable, but a liberty within certain limits 
may be subject to laws of its own, of which the laws of nature may be considered either 
as inclusive, or as exclusive.* 
IV. The necessary First Cause may either be considered separately from the aggregate 
of phenomena, or it may be regarded as a portion of “ the absolute totality of the complex 
of existing things.” | 
261. Hamilton gives some “ contradictions proving the psychological theory of the con- 
ditioned,”+ which look strangely out of place in a work by a disciple of the Scotch school, 
but which result necessarily from his questionable qualifications of the theory, “that all 
* T cannot imagine any more concise and satisfactory solution of Kant’s third Antinomy (provided we assume 
that the unconditioned is a fit subject for reasoning), than the one given by Solly (p. 24-5). ‘‘ Now the uncon- 
ditioned cause is necessarily free ; for were it not so, it would be subject to a condition, a supposition which is ex- 
cluded by the hypothesis. The conditioned cause, on the other hand, is necessarily not free, for otherwise it would 
not be limited by a condition, which is equally excluded by the hypothesis. If, however, we take the whole of 
nature, and seek for its cause, inasmuch as it comprises all conditioned causes within itself, the cause in question 
must clearly be unconditioned and free. While therefore the causality 7x nature is conditioned, the cause of 
nature itself is unconditioned.” [Should we not. rather say, the cause of nature is only self-conditioned ?] 
{ Metaphysics, p. 682. See also pp. 527-831. 
