542 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
anthropological triplicate of reason, soul, and body, it corresponds also to the division of 
theoretical knowledge into science (or thinking), current opinions (or sense-perception), 
and ignorance; to the triple ladder of eroticism in the symposium and the mythological 
representation connected with this of Poros, Eros, and Penia; to the metaphysical tri- 
plicates of the ideal world, mathematical relations and the sensible world.” d., p. 99. 
310. Aristotle calls the soul in plants, nutritive,—in animals, sensitive; “lastly, the 
human soul is at the same time nutritive, sensitive, and cognitive.” Id., p. 129. 
311. According to Aristotle, “It is by three things, therefore, nature, habit, and reason, 
that man becomes good.” Jd., p. 132. 
312. “To the two cosmical principles already received, viz., the world-soul and the 
world-reason, a third and higher one was added by the New Platonists. For if the 
reason apprehends the true by means of thinking, and not within itself alone; if, in order 
to grasp the absolute and behold the divine, it must lose its own self-consciousness, and 
go out beyond itself, then reason cannot be the highest principle, but there stands above it 
that primal essence, with which it must be united if it will behold the true. To this primal 
essence, Plotinus gives different names, as ‘the First, ‘the One, ‘the Good,’ and ‘that 
which stands above being.’ . . . In all these names, Plotinus does not profess to have 
satisfactorily expressed the essence of this primal One, but only to have given a represen- 
tation of it. In characterizing it still further, he denies it all thinking and willing, be- 
cause it needs nothing and can desire nothing; it is not energy, but above energy; life 
does not belong to it; neither being nor essence, nor any of the most general categories 
of being can be ascribed to it; in short, it is that which can neither be expressed nor 
thought.” Id., p. 155. 
313. “The system of Spinoza rests upon three fundamental conceptions, from which all 
the rest may be derived with mathematical necessity. These conceptions are that of sub- 
stance, of attribute, and of mode.” d., p. 185. 
314. According to Locke, “the complex ideas may be referred to three classes, viz., the 
ideas of mode, of substance, and of relation. . . . Our idea of substance is distinguished 
from all other complex ideas, in the fact that it is an idea which has its archetype distinct 
from ourselves, and possesses objective reality, while other complex ideas are formed by 
the mind at pleasure, and have no reality corresponding to them external to the mind. 
We do not know what is the archetype of substance, and of substance itself we are 
acquainted only with its attributes. A relation arises when the understanding has con- 
nected two things with each other in such a way, that in considering them, it passes over 
from the one to the other.” Jd., p. 196. 
315, “God gives us ideas; but as it would be contradictory to assert that a being 
could give us what it does not possess, so ideas exist in God, and we derive them from 
