544 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
besides the first fundamental principle, there are yet two others to be considered, the first 
of which is unconditioned as to its content, but as to its form, conditioned through and 
derived from the first fundamental principle; the other the reverse. The.relation of these 
three principles to each other is, in fine, this, viz., that the second stands opposed to the * 
first, while the third is the product of the two. Hence, according to this plan, the first 
absolute principle starts from the Ego, the second opposes to the Ego a thing, or a Non- 
Ego, and the third brings forward the Ego again in reaction against the thing, or the Non- 
Ego. This method of Fichte (thesis,—antithesis,—synthesis), is the same as Hegel sub- 
sequently adopted and applied to the whole system of philosophy, a union of the synthetical 
and analytical methods.” Jd., p. 285. 
321. “Schelling thus distinguishes the two sides of philosophy. All knowledge rests 
upon the harmony of a subject with an object. ‘That which is simply objective is natural, 
and that which is simply subjective is the Ego or intelligence. There are two possible 
ways of uniting these two sides: we may either make nature first, and inquire how it is 
that intelligence is associated with it (natural philosophy), or we may make the subject 
first, and inquire how do objects proceed from the subject (transcendental philosophy). 
The end of all philosophy must be to make either an intelligence out of nature, or a nature 
out of intelligence. . . Both, however, are only the two poles of one and the same know- 
ledge, which reciprocally attract each other; hence, if we start from either pole, we are 
necessarily drawn towards the other.” Jd., p. 318. 
322. [Hegel.] “Mind is at first theoretical mind, or intelligence, and then practical 
mind, or will. It is theoretical in that it has to do with the rational as something given, 
and now posits it as its own; it is practical in that it immediately wills the subjective 
content (truth), which it has as its own, to be freed from its one-sided subjective form, and 
transformed into an objective. The practical mind is, so far, the truth of the theoretical. 
The theoretical mind, in its way to the practical, passes through the stages of intuition, 
representation, and thought, and the will on its side forms itself into a free will through 
impulse, desire, and inclination... . 
323. “ This stand-point [of moral reflection] has three elements: (1) the element of reso- 
lution (vorsatz), where we consider the inner determination of the acting subject, that 
which allows an act to be ascribed only to me, and the blame of it to rest only on my 
will (imputation) ; (2) the element of purpose, where the completed act is regarded not 
according to its consequences, but according to its relative worth in reference to myself. 
The resolution was still internal; but now the act is completed, and I must suffer myself 
to judge according to the constituents of the act, because I must have known the circum- 
stances under which I acted; (3) the element of the good, where the act is judged accord- 
ing to its universal worth. The good is peculiarly the reconciliation of the particular 
