546 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
being whatever than volition. Volition is primordial being, and with this alone all its 
predicates of groundlessness, independence of time, and self-affirmation conform.” d., p. 
266. | 
330. [Hegel.] ‘‘ Universality, speciality, and individuality, are accordingly the three 
momenta of the idea, and are present in it as an unity. . . 
«We are consequently suddenly withdrawn from the sphere of the subjective logic, and 
transported into the region of objectivity, or into the ‘ doctrine of the object,’ which resolves 
itself into ‘mechanism, chemism, and teleology.’” Jd., pp. 335, 338. 
331. “The Hegelian fundamental schema,—Being, Naught,* Origination,—does not 
correspond to the schema of objective teleology,—principle, means, and effect; but the 
origination or process, 7. e. the means, is interposed as an eternal self-mediation in the 
place of the purpose.” Jd., p. 381. 
332. “ We have in the present work traversed but a comparatively small, although rich, 
division of the whole development of Philosophy,—in short, its last or modern phase only ; 
and have seen in this that the chief business of human thought is and must be to discover 
principle, means, and end, both in the singular and in the whole. All three moments 
ought to be one or united; but they must also be distinguished, and each in its own place 
must necessarily be that to which, Ly this place, it is entitled or justified.” Jd., p. 38. 
333. In all the foregoing quotations, it is easy and interesting to trace the influence of 
the great idea of relativity, and in nearly every instance the idea is plainly developed 
under the forms of direction to, in, or from some assumed subjective or objective centre, 
although, in consequence of the experimental nature of the development, the boundaries 
of the several forms are not as clearly marked as they would have been, if the theoretical 
limitation had been thoroughly understood, and constantly kept in view. 
CHAPTER XI. 
DEDUCTION OF THE KANTIAN CATEGORIES. 
334, In attempting to reach the swmma genera of the knowable, we may start either 
from the objects of thought, or from thought itself, The results of the two processes will 
* Allour reasoning about the Absolute must be, as Mansel well observes (p. 85), not about “the nature of the 
Absolute in itself, but only our own conception of that nature. The distortions of the image reflected may arise 
only from the inequalities of the mirror reflecting it.’ If we imagine the Absolute to be not only independent of 
relation, but absolutely devoid of relation,.our conception of it, like Hegel’s, must be simply Naught. 
