DEDUCTION OF THE KANTIAN CATEGORIES. 547 
naturally differ, but the difference should not be irreconcilable, and philosophy can never 
make much progress until a reconciliation is effected. ‘“ Aristotle attempted a synthesis 
of things in their multiplicity,—a classification of objects real, but in relation to thought ; 
—Kant, an analysis of mind in its unity,—a dissection of thought, pure, but in relation to 
its objects. The predicaments of Aristotle are thus objective, of things as understood ; 
those of Kant subjective, of the mind as understanding. The former are results a poste- 
riori,— the creations of abstraction and generalization ; the latter, anticipations a priori,— 
the conditions of those acts themselves.”* 
330. The method of Aristotle was nearly perfected by its author, and for more than 
two thousand years, his disciples have endeavored in vain to extend or improve his system. 
The method of Kant was merely initial, and the revival of philosophy during the past 
century has shown that it was productive. It has the advantage of starting from that 
which is best known, the subjective, in its endeavors to learn the unknown, while Aristo- 
tle started from the objective, of which he was obliged to assume a reality for which he 
had only subjective evidence. 
336. Without attempting to harmonize the objective and subjective categories,—with- 
out even endeavoring to give the best philosophical explanation of the basis on which 
either of them rests,—it may reasonably be expected that a subjective symbolism should 
at least show a possible mode, if not the best mode, of accounting for Kant’s empirical ar- 
rangement of the subjective categories. Let us see with what success we can deduce them 
from the relations of the primitive forms of Consciousness. 
337. All analysis proceeds from the general to the particular that is embraced under it. 
Our highest general idea of the mind, is the idea of Consciousness, and the first question 
that suggests itself for our analysis is, How does Consciousness regard the objects of its 
cognition, or in what different modes can it consider them? The answer will naturally 
be sought in accordance with the conditions of Motivity, Spontaneity, and Rationality. 
338. Motivity, although it refers to objects exterior to ourselves, cannot immediately 
give us those objects. It relates only to phenomena, and to the influence of those phe- 
nomena on our own minds. If, for example, I receive a sensation of solidity, or heat, or 
color, the sensation is entirely subjective; it belongs exclusively to myself, and not to the 
body, to which Motivity refers as its cause. I cannot, therefore, merely as receptive, 
assert the reality of anything objective; the most I can do is to admit its Possibility. 
339. Spontaneity, being exclusively subjective in its action as well as its reference, is 
entirely valid in all its determinations. I know absolutely all that I feel, wish, do, or 
think, and hence I derive a consciousness superior to the mere possibility of the Motivity,— 
* Hamilton: Discussions, p. 32. 
