556 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
386. Space and Time have been considered by some writers as mere forms of thought, 
having no existence in themselves independent of our own minds. So far as they relate 
to our cognitions and render them possible, this view is correct; but so far as they relate 
to the objects of our cognitions, and render them possible, their objective reality must be 
as entire, as that of the objects which they embrace.* If they were indeed mere subjec- 
tive forms, their existence would of itself be sufficient evidence of the Eternal and Infinite 
existence of an Intelligent Being, and in the difficulty that many of the most profound 
investigators find, in assigning to them any other than a subjective existence, we have 
another evidence of the fundamentally subjective nature of all Being. 
387. Kant, in consequence of the subjective character of his whole system of philosophy, 
attended mainly to the subjective phase of Space and Time, and because their ideas, as 
they exist in the mind, are adequate,—or in other words, because objective space and 
time have precisely those properties which are fully embraced in our subjective ideas, and 
no others,—he may, perhaps, have sometimes been led to doubt their objective reality. 
His language, at least, is such as to afford a plausible justification to those of his suc- 
cessors who have denied such reality, and thus involved themselves in endless confusion 
and mystification. As Kant is often quoted, in defence of reasoning which is capable of 
such perversion, it may be well to quote somewhat largely from his remarks on Space, in 
order to ascertain, as nearly as possible, what his views really were. / 
388. ‘“ By means of the external sense (a property of our mind), we represent to our- 
selves objects as external to us, and these all in space. . . The internal sense, by means 
of which the mind envisages itself or its internal state, gives indeed no intuition of the 
soul itself as an object; but there is still a determinate form, under which the intuition 
of its internal state alone is possible, so that all which belongs to the internal determina- 
tions is represented in relationships of Time. Externally, Time can be viewed as little as 
Space, as something in us. Now what are Time and Space? Are they real beings? Are 
they in fact only determinations, or likewise relations of things, but still such as would 
belong to these things in themselves, though they should not be envisaged; or are they 
such, that they cleave only to the form of the intuition, and consequently to the subjective 
property of our mind, without which these predicates could not be attributed even to any- 
(Honea a a 
389. “1st. Space is no empirical conception which has been derived from external ex- 
* Hven Hamilton says (Discussions, p. 572), ‘It is one merit of the philosophy of the Conditioned, that it 
proves space to be only a law of thought, and not a law of things.” Is this true? Is not space a law of things 
material? Although the soul acts in space, we do not necessarily think of it as occupying any definite place. If 
space is a law of thought, it is so far a law of mind, and it would seem to be still more a law of such forms of re- 
ality as can exist only in space. 
