558 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
representations in itself. Nevertheless, space is so thought (for all parts of space are in- 
finitely coexistent); consequently, the original representation of space is Intuition a 
priori, and not Conception. ... . 
393. “ Now, how can an external intuition dwell in the mind, which precedes the ob- 
jects themselves, and in which intuition the conception of these last may be determined, 
a priori? Evidently not otherwise than so far as it (intwition) has its seat merely in the 
subject, as the formal property of this (subject) being affected by objects, and thereby of 
receiving immediate representation of them; that is, Jntuition, consequently, only as form 
of the external sense in general. . . . 
“Conclusions from the above Conceptions. 
394. “1st. SPACE represents no property at all of any things in themselves, nor does it 
represent them in their relationship to each other; that is, it represents no determination 
of them which attaches to the objects themselves, and which remains if we also make ab- 
straction of all the subjective conditions of intuition. For neither absolute nor relative 
determinations can be envisaged before the existence of the things to which they belong, 
nor consequently @ priori.* 
395. “2d. Space is nothing else but the form only of all phenomena of the external 
senses,—that is, the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone external intui- 
tion is possible to us. Now, since the receptivity of the subject to be affected by objects 
necessarily precedes all intuitions of these objects, it may be understood how the form of 
all phenomena can be given in the mind previous to all real perceptions, consequently @ 
priori; and how this, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, can 
contain principles of their relationships prior to all experience. 
396. “ We can, therefore, only from the point of view as men, speak of Space, Ex- 
tended Beings, &c. If we depart from the subjective condition under which we alone 
can receive external intuition, that is to say, the way we may be affected by objects, the 
representation of space then means nothing. This predicate is only so far applied to 
things as they appear to us,—that is, as they are objects of sensibility. The constant 
form of this receptivity, which we name sensibility, is a necessary condition of all rela- 
tionships wherein objects are envisaged as external to us, and if we make abstraction of 
these objects, it is a pure intuition which bears the name of Space. As we cannot make 
the particular conditions of sensibility into the conditions of the possibility of things, but 
only of their phenomena, we may very well say that space comprehends all things that 
may appear to us externally, but not all things in themselves,—whether they can or 
* This is a petitio principit, as Kant himself admits with regard to subjective space. 
