560 INTELLECTUAL SYMBOLISM. 
“objective validity in respect of all objects that may ever be offered to our senses. And 
as our intuition is always sensible, an object can never thus be given to us in experience, 
which could not stand under the condition of time. On the other hand, we deny to time 
[and space] all claim to absolute Reality, that is to say, that without regard to the form of 
our sensible intuition, it absolutely inheres in things as condition or property. Such pro- 
perties as belong to things in themselves, can never be given to us by the senses.””* 
400. Space and Time are thus merely excluded, like all else of which we take cogni- 
zance by our senses or other faculties, from the realm of ‘“ absolute reality,” while it is - 
admitted that they have the same relative or “empirical reality” as all other objects of 
which we can acquire any experience or knowledge. If there is no absolute [independent] 
reality in space and time, there can be no such thing as motion or change. Kant concedes 
this, “but,” he says, ‘“‘if I could envisage myself, or if any other being could envisage me, 
without this condition of sensibility, the self-same determinations which we represent to 
ourselves now, as changes, would then afford us a cognition, in which the representation of 
time, and consequently also of change, would not at all occur.” + 
401. It is undoubtedly true, that we do not fully comprehend all the properties, and 
consequently, all the reality of most of the objects that fall under our cognizance. Intelli- 
gent beings might perhaps be differently constituted, so as to “envisage” things under 
other conditions, and thus to discern a different set of properties, which would convey 
an idea of reality either more or less adequate than our own. But so vague a hypothesis 
furnishes no grounds for philosophizing. 
402. Everything that has properties either inherent or relative, is a real thing. If the 
properties are such as belong exclusively to Intelligence, the reality is subjective,—if they 
belong either wholly or in part to anything else, the reality is objective. Every objective 
property has, indeed, two sides, one objective, as it exists in the object cognized, and one 
subjective, as it affects the cognizing mind, and it is in many cases impossible for us to 
determine the degree of resemblance between the two, or the adequacy of our ideas. But 
this fact, instead of weakening our belief in objective reality, should rather tend to 
strengthen the conviction, that every subjective impression is evidence of an objective 
impress, and that every “empirical reality” that we discover is a representation and 
evidence, more or less complete, of the true reality. 
403. Under this conviction, we may readily assent to Kant’s lemma, that ‘the simple 
but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence, proves the existence of 
objects in space out of me,” and we may agree with him in rejecting both “the proble- 
* Kant, p. 33. + Kant, p. 34. 
