110 SECTIONAL ADDRESSES 
never wholly, perhaps not even principally, economic ; for they have their 
roots deep in national sentiment. Economic union, therefore, has been 
followed by political union, just as the establishment of a powerful con- 
solidated homogeneous kingdom in France followed the abolition of 
provincial tariffs there in the eighteenth century. It is the feeling or 
suspicion that there is this tendency for political union to follow customs 
agreements among neighbouring states with similar cultural institutions 
which inspires opposition to the proposed Danubian pacts and other trade 
conventions in central and eastern Europe. It may be that the tendency 
does not work in the reverse direction and that the growing independence of 
units which have hitherto been in close political union is shown in their 
determination to assert themselves in the economic sphere. It may also be 
the case that it is felt that a measure of economic independence or self- 
sufficiency is necessary for the proper enjoyment of the newly granted 
political independence. Whichever is true the attainment of real economic 
unity in the British Empire will not be an easy task. 
VIII. 
It will now be abundantly clear that the short-term influences making 
for economic self-sufficiency draw much of their inspiration and derive 
most of their impetus from instability of currencies and the unforeseen 
and violent movements of prices which always accompany unstable 
standards of value. The first and most pressing problem, therefore, 
is that of currency stabilisation ; for on its solution depend not only the 
disappearance of those novel and harmful restrictions on international 
trade already examined, but also, which is much more important, full 
economic recovery everywhere throughout the world. ‘That must be the 
excuse, if one were needed, for a glance at some of the considerations 
bearing on the choice of policy to be pursued in connection with this 
general question of currency reconstitution. 
It will be remembered that the principal cause of the failure of the 
World Economic Conference of 1933 was the realisation that it was not 
then possible to secure agreement even among the more important nations, 
much less the general consent of representatives of all the countries 
present, on a programme of currency stabilisation. Much has happened 
since then and more than one nation has discovered how to contrive a 
more even balance on income and outgo account through the medium of 
a currency freed from gold which can be manipulated so as to ward off 
awkward price movements at home and the immediate need for internal 
economic readjustment. It is probable, therefore, that if another 
world conference were to meet now, general agreement concerning action 
would not be any easier to obtain than it was two years ago. This, how- 
ever, ought not to interfere with joint or single action on the part of some 
of the financially stronger nations whose lead the weaker would necessarily 
have to follow. Indeed, the latter, during a period of international 
monetary chaos like the present, can indulge without much hurt to them- 
selves or the rest of the world in experiments aimed at self-sufficiency 
and permit fluctuations in the external values of their currencies without 
serious repercussions elsewhere. But the fluctuations of the rates of 
