THE LAW OF HABIT. 33 



irrelevant to our subject to discuss the force of Mr. Mill's arguments 

 in proof of his thesis as to the ultimate motive to action, and its con- 

 sistency with the possibility of disinterestedness. It could easily be 

 shown that, whatever possible construction be placed upon his state- 

 ments, they involve an inconsistency. We are concerned, at present, 

 only with his opinions regarding the nature of the state at which a 

 man has arrived when we say that his action has become habitual. 

 And while it is not denied that the force of habit may set up the 

 standard of absolute dominion, and man may be its slave, " bound 

 hand and foot," we nevertheless maintain that even in such a case a 

 man's actions are done from motive, and the sway of habit is but the 

 triumph of some particular motive over all opposing forces. For 

 why is anything called a motive 1 Because, as it is in the mind's 

 view, it stimulates to action. Why, even, do men say that pleasure 

 is a motive 1 For no reason other than that pleasure is an end, to 

 the attainment of which men direct their energies. To whatever 

 extent views may differ as to the ]-elation between motives and 

 volitions, the general statement will not be disputed, that of motive 

 no other account than that above indicated can be given, namely, as 

 the end aimed at, which, as contemplated by the mind, stimulates to 

 action. A motive is constituted whenever an end definitely in the 

 mind's view is considered in some respect desirable. Well then, 

 when a man by continued indulgence has so enslaved himself that 

 froui sheer force of habit he continues to pursue some end of action 

 which has long ceased to give him pleasure, and which may even reap 

 for him a " harvest of pain," are there not present all the elements 

 requisite to constitute a motive 1 Does not the desire of attaining 

 the end at which he actually aims stand to his action in the same 

 relation in which the desire of pleasure stood, and is it not thus the 

 motive of his action in precisely the same sense in which the desire 

 of pleasure was the motive whei-e pleasure was the end sought 1 It 

 is not true that as we proceed in the formation of habits we^cease to 

 act from motive. Our motives may in the course of such develop- 

 ment change, and permanently change, certain ends of action may 

 forever lose their charm, and thus be stripped of their prompting or 

 stimulating power, ceasing in this way to be motives, but they die 

 only in giving way to stronger forces. The formation of a habit is 

 not the disappearance of motive, it is rather the setting of some 

 motive upon a throne, it having acquired such power as to operate 

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