154 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE. 



comparatively short time, yet, if they were attacked on either flank 

 it would take a much longer time to collect them. The readiest 

 mode of attacking Wellington from France was on his right, that is, 

 by way of Mons and Ath, as will be seen by looking at the maj) of 

 France and Belgium. He expected to be so attacked. His secret 

 orders of the 30th April, 1815, are a proof of this statement. Hav- 

 ing premised that he had received intelligence that Napoleon was 

 about to visit the northern frontier, he proceeds : — 



" In this case the enemy's line of attack will be either between 

 " the Lys and the Scheldt, or between the Sambre and Scheldt, or 

 " by both lines." 



It was neither. It was between the Sambre and the Meuse, and 

 on his extreme left, not on his right or left centre. But Wellington's 

 mind was pre-occupied with his own idea, and even when the attack 

 came on his extreme left he gave orders for concentration on 

 Nivelles, which, fortunately for his reputation, were disobeyed. Had 

 they been followed. Napoleon's left wing would probably have been 

 in Brussels on the 1 6th of June. 



Napoleon struck the allies precisely where they were weak, just 

 at the point where it took them longest to concentrate. His strategy 

 deserved to succeed, and the impartial stvident, however much he 

 may find it necessary to blame Napoleon in his career, can only come 

 to one conclusion on this master stroke. Unquestionably Napoleon 

 did surprise Wellington and Bliicher, his plan was well laid, ably 

 executed, and only miscarried from a series of strange accidents; 

 which, as one reads of them, seem as if they were the result of super- 

 natural interference. 



The campaign being one of attack, it will be best understood by 

 following the attacking force. The French army, being collected in 

 three divisions, advanced during the night of the 14th in three 

 columns, the left from Solre-sur-Sambre (see map) by Thuin upon 

 Marchiennes ; the centre from Beaumont by Ham-sur-Heure upon 

 Charleroi : and the right from Philippeville (not on map) by Ger- 

 pines upon Chatelet. 



Now happened the first check. General De Bourmont, a General 

 of Division, with some of his stafi", deserted. The effect was most 

 depressing. The confidence of the soldiers in their officers, of the 

 officers in each other, of Napoleon in his lieutenants, was shaken. 

 It is difficult to speak calmly of such an act. The strangest part of 



