THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. 161 



40,000 men would have overthrown 7,000 troops, many of whom 

 were doubtful, being Dutch Belgians suspected of French sympathies, 

 and with no supports at hand. Napoleon with 83,000 would have 

 had to attack 31,000, true, with another 31,000 to support them^ 

 but that support nine miles away. The object of the sudden attack 

 was therefore possible of accomplishment. The question is, did 

 Napoleon display the energy which the crisis demanded, or did he 

 press the advantages so far in his favour 1 It must be remembered 

 that fully 25,000 of the French centre and right had not crossed the 

 Sambre on the night of the 15th. It required two or three hours at 

 least to get these troops over, and as they were the reserve artillery 

 and heavy cavalry, besides Lobau's infantry, 10,000 strong, it was 

 absolutely necessary to wait for them. Again, Gerard's corps was 

 at Ch^telet, and had to be moved up to Fleurus, about seven miles, 

 while Vandamme had five miles to cover. The Guards had nine 

 miles to march from Charleroi to reach the front. 



In view of these facts, and bearing in mind that Napoleon had to 

 wait for the reports of his varioiis reconnoitering parties, any charge 

 of too great delay on his part on the morning of the 16th appears 

 unreasonable and unfair. He rose at five o'clock. His orders to 

 his right to concentrate were sent out before eight o'clock, those 

 for Ney before nine o'clock. He himself reached the front about 

 noon. The French left and centre were in position by one o'clock, 

 and the attack on the Prussians began at two. It is not easy to see 

 how it could have begun much earlier in the day. At the same 

 time he was doing all he could to bring iip his left without actually 

 going over in person. He sent Ney a dispatch early in the morning, 

 asking for exact information as to the position of his various corps. 

 As above stated, he sent a general order of movement, and also a 

 personal letter, giving full explanations of the plan of operations 

 before nine o'clock. He sent another dispatch at ten o'clock in reply 

 to a hesitating message from Ney. He sent another at two, and 

 another at three, or a little after. All were urgent expressions of 

 his desire that Ney should advance, and if possible manoeuvre to join 

 the right. But Ney, or rather Ney's subordinate, Count Reille, 

 for reasons satisfactory to himself, did not think fit to obey at once 

 the first order to advance, which reached him about half-past ten. 

 Having asked further instructions fi'om Ney, the order to advance 

 was repeated, but he did not come into the field until one o'clock. 



