THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. 169 



might expect the next day. Between the effect of their charge at 

 Genappes and a tei'rible thunder-storm, it was evening before Napo- 

 leon came face to face with Wellington at Mont St. Jean. The em- 

 peror deployed his cavalry and guns to feel whether he had a rear 

 guard to deal with, or Wellington's whole army. When he ascer- 

 tained that it was the latter, we read that he was pleased. He was 

 destined to be more than satisfied, but the question is, was he justi- 

 fied in his opinion that the game was now in his own hands 1 We 

 will endeavour to give a fair answer to this question, founded on 

 the statement of the position of the various armies, as stated in the 

 sequel. 



ACT IV. 



SCENE : — WATERLOO AND WAVRE. 

 Time :- 18th June, 1815. 



It is half-past eleven in the morning, Marshal Grouchy is sitting 

 at breakfast in the garden of the notary Halbaert, at Sart-Ies-Wal- 

 hain. With him are Gerard, Yandamme, Yalaze, an engineer 

 officer, and Baltus, in command of the artillery. Suddenly Col. 

 Simon Lorriere enters and says: "I hear firing." The party go 

 out to the garden, and there heavy reports are heard, so heavy that 

 the ground seems to tremble. '-It is the emperor, he is fighting the 

 " English, let us join him," says Gerard, " We should march 

 " towards the guns." " No," says Grouchy. " My orders are to 

 " move to Wavre, and to Wavre I am going." The decision was 

 fatal to France, disastrous to Napoleon, and damning for .Grouchy's 

 reputation. To correctly appreciate the situation it is necessaiy to 

 retrace our steps to the position of matters after Ligny, that is on 

 the evening of the day before the one of the incident above related. 



We have seen that Napoleon sent out Pajol's cavalry in pursuit of 

 the Prussians. Pajol took the Namur road, that is eastward towards 

 the French right. The Prussians however wei-e by that time in 

 retreat towards Wavre, that is northwards, so as to join Wellington. 

 There has never been so masterly a retreat, or so determined a 

 strategy, as that of Gneisenau. It is impossible to give the Prussian 

 army too much credit for their steadiness and courage during this 

 retrograde movement. While retiring they at the same time used 

 their cavalry in constant and vigilant patrolling, and in this respect 

 were as active as their descendants were in 1870, while the French 



