THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY. 53 



" defect of reason from diseases of the mind as not to know the 

 natui-e and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did not know it. 

 that he did not know he was doing what was wrong," goes on to say- 

 that this illustrates a civil case of a will fully under the same prin- 

 ciple. In a case of murder, for example, you have, say a knife in the 

 hand of the accused. Does the latter know the consequences of 

 putting the knife in the heart of the living man, and does he know 

 it is wrong 1 In the other case of a disputed will, put his possessions, 

 his money before the testator. Does he know the effect of signing 

 with a pen in his hand a sheet of paper that will operate as his will 1 

 Does he know his property, his relatives, and their claims on him, 

 and so on*? 



One American case has not followed these views of the English 

 jurists, and of the general conclusion of American judges, but held 

 that a less degree of imbecility is necessary to invalidate a will than 

 would be found for acquittal from a criminal charge. As Mr. 

 Balfour Brown has expressed it, " The question in connection with 

 crime is : Does the accused know what he is about, and can he 

 refrain ; has he capacity to choose one course rather than another '1 

 That in connection with testamentary dispositions is : Did the 

 testator know what he was about, and had he power to will this dis- 

 position 1 " And so if he knows that death ensued to a living man 

 by means of wound with a knife, and that he knows he is raising his 

 arm and has the strength necessary, there is knowledge sufficient to' 

 criminate ; otherwise the knife was, as Mr. Brown puts it, a mere 

 instrument in the hands of disease. The knowledge in the civil case 

 is of a like character; a man must know whether he had $100 or 

 $10,000 worth of property; he must know that a will is an instru- 

 ment by which his wishes are given effect to after his death ; he 

 must know whether or not he has relatives, who are his relatives, 

 and what claims they have on him and his bovinby. If he knows 

 nothing of these things, he knows not what he is doing. In the 

 same way the law holds that if he knows these and is insane upon 

 every other point, his will is valid as if he were sane in every par- 

 ticular. This may be taken as an exact enough summing on this 

 prolific source of litigation ; and the civil side may be disposed of 

 with the remai'k that as to contracts generally it requires much more 

 capacity than to make a will, though even this is now questioned. 



