SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy, 213 



it depends on the interpretation of the language in which it is de- 

 livered, we must go back upon Locke's Essat/, which determined the 

 terminology and phraseology of philosophical writings for a long 

 time, both in England and in France. The problem of Locke's work, 

 as its title implies, is a scientific explanation of human understanding; 

 and this problem is reduced to the question, "What is the origin of 

 human understanding, or, in other words, of human knowledge? 

 In the solution, which the Essay gives, of this problem, human know- 

 ledge is explained as originated exclusively by the action of the phe- 

 nomena which are presented to the mind from the period of birth 

 onwards, none ot these phenomena being admitted to have had any 

 prior existence involved in the nature of the mind. Now, the phe- 

 nomena which are presented in human knowledge, and which, there- 

 fore, form the immediate objects of the mind when it knows, Locke 

 named ideas.* It will thus be seen how the problem of the Essay 

 came to be expressed in the question, What is the origin of our ideas? 

 and this became the form in which the problem of philosophy con- 

 tinued to be studied in the school of Locke. It is not necessary 

 here even to touch upon the detailed analysis of our ideas, into 

 which the Essay enters with the view of vindicatitifg its theory re- 

 garding their origin ; but it is necessary to notice the* fact, that ideas, 

 or the immediate objects of knowledge, though, of course, existing as 

 ideas, are still regarded as only in some way revealing to us real exis- 

 t£nce which can never itself be known. Now, in the light of this 

 philosophy and its phraseology, the doctrine of Berkeley must be re- 

 cognised as bearing a very different significance from that which is 

 usually ascribed to it. There ar«, at least, three points in his doc- 

 trine, which I am confident that an examination of the Dialogues be- 

 tween Hylas and Philonous will confirm at every page. 



1. Berkeley maintained the common belief of men, that sensible 

 things, that is, the things which form the immediate objects of per- 

 ception, really exist, and are not, as most of philosophers maintain, 

 merely images of a real world, which we do not and cannot perceive. 



2. But the question with Berkeley is strictly not whether sensible 

 things really exist, or not ; but what is meant by saying that they 

 exist really ? Now, according to the common doctrine of philoso- 

 phers, which Berkeley combats, the real existence, which we ascribe 

 to the material universe, is predicable not of the things which we 



* See Bssat/, Book 11^ chap. 1, sec. 1. 



