222 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 



it is that which distinguishes his place in the development of British 

 speculation and gives his philosophy an importance it never could 

 have derived from the principle which he regarded as its distinctive 

 peculiarity. For as the growth of philosophical speculation unfolds 

 into clearer prominence the real meaning of the problems which it has 

 to solve, it will be found that the conclusions of philosophers regard- 

 ing the principle involved in the " ideal theory " must depend on 

 their conclusions regarding the origin of our knowledge. There is 

 not here space for an explanation and proof of the above statement ; 

 but it may be sufficient in the present connection to notice the fact, 

 that in disproving the '* ideal theory " Reid himself is obliged to 

 adduce beliefs which he regards as originated by the very constitution 

 of our minds, and as therefore having an origin prior to experience. 

 It is in this connection that the doctrine of Hutcheson, with regard to 

 internal senses, assumes historical importance as having possibly sug- 

 gested the general name of common sense for the source of those 

 beliefs which are common to all mankind and are considered capable 

 of explanation only as original and compulsory issues of intelligence. 

 Moreover the statement I have made regarding the actual fundamea- 

 tal principle of Reid acquires additional confirmation, from the fact 

 thfit the Scottish philosophy, of which he is regarded as the chief 

 representative, is, when named after its distinctive characteristic, 

 usually designated the philosophy of common sense. 



"While a correct historical estimate of Reid's philosophy thus seems 

 forced to raise into special prominence his assertion, for some of the 

 elements which constitute human knowledge, of an existence indepen- 

 dent on experience, it is scarcely possible to avoid surprise at the 

 slender grasp with which he holds this principle and the unskilful 

 manner in which he applies it in his explanation of the mental 

 phenomena. This may indeed be partly accounted for by the fact, 

 already mentioned, that he was ignorant of the prominence due to 

 this doctrine of his system ; but it also arose from his never having 

 clearly apprehended any criterion, by which the a priori facts in con- 

 sciousness could be readily recognised. For although Sir William 

 Hamilton gives Reid the credit of having discovered such a criterion 

 of these facts in their neeessiii/,"^ yet not only are Reid's references to 

 this characteristic so incidental as to afford no ground for believing 

 that he recognised it as the criterion, but his doctrine of first princi- 



* Reid's Works, p. 3-^3 a, note ; and Lectures on Metaphysics Vol. II , p. 359. 



